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 In two recent, provocative articles, Professors Stephen Choi and 
Mitu Gulati contend that a tournament based on objective considera-
tions of judicial merit should govern our approach to the nomination 
and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.1 Professors Choi and 
Gulati developed their three quantitative tournament criteria—
seeking to measure productivity, independence, and quality among 
sitting appellate judges2—for prospective application. It seems rea-
sonable that these same criteria could be used to compare two con-
temporaneous Supreme Court nominees from a somewhat earlier 
era, in order to consider whether one emerges as more “worthy.” 
Such a comparison is likely to be especially instructive if both nomi-
nees then ended up serving on the Supreme Court, thus allowing for 
                                                                                                                     
 * Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law; Law Clerk to Justice Black-
mun, October Term 1980. I received helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft 
from Victor Brudney, Ellen Deason, and Alan Michaels. I am grateful for the excellent re-
search assistance provided by Rebecca Fitzthum and Sara Sampson and for valuable tech-
nical and statistical support received from Cory Smidt. I thank Amy Beaudreault for her 
fine assistance in the preparation of this Essay. The Ohio State University Moritz College 
of Law and its Center for Law, Policy, and Social Science each contributed generous finan-
cial support for this project. 
 1. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choos-
ing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking].  
 2. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 305-10; Choi & Gulati, Empirical 
Ranking, supra note 1, at 42-67. 
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observations regarding their actual performance, not simply their 
tournament-related potential. 
 Two such Justices conveniently exist: Warren Burger and Harry 
Blackmun. As federal appellate judges, Burger and Blackmun served 
for comparable lengths of time during the same historical period.3 
They were nominated for the Supreme Court by the same President, 
who had made clear that he wanted new members of the Court to re-
flect a certain judicial philosophy.4 As Supreme Court Justices, how-
ever, Burger and Blackmun came to differ sharply in their doctrinal 
and ideological orientation. Commentators also have diverged in 
evaluating their respective careers on the Court. 
 In this Essay, I compare the “objective merit” outputs of Warren 
Burger and Harry Blackmun as appellate judges, in order to consider 
some of the challenges involved when assessing the merit-related po-
tential of Supreme Court nominees. Part I discusses the appellate 
court records of Judges Burger and Blackmun, borrowing from Choi 
and Gulati’s three quantitative criteria. Judge Burger’s performance 
appears more promising in the area of productivity and on one meas-
ure of independence, while the two judges seem comparably strong 
with respect to the quality factor. Part I then suggests how little 
guidance these quantitative assessments provide when reviewing the 
two men’s careers on the Supreme Court. For Justice Burger, a re-
cord of independence in appellate court opinion writing seems, in ret-
rospect, to have foreshadowed an aloof and at times fractious atti-
tude toward his colleagues while serving as Chief Justice. Justice 
Blackmun’s tenure on the Court was characterized by his evolving 
perspectives—in terms of the social vision he embraced and the effect 
that vision had on his judicial philosophy. Blackmun’s evolution, 
which is often invoked by persons who consider him a distinguished 
Justice, could scarcely have been anticipated based on a quantitative 
review of his appellate court performance. 
 Part II addresses in more general terms certain reservations 
about the performance measurement approach proposed by Choi and 
Gulati. Efforts to assess potential judicial merit are surely necessary 
prerequisites to appointment, but they ought not to preclude consid-
eration of political and ideological factors. The Constitution contem-
plates that a candidate’s partisan or ideological background may be 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Judge Burger served on the D.C. Circuit for over thirteen years, from April 1956 
to June 1969. Judge Blackmun served on the Eighth Circuit for nearly eleven years, from 
November 1959 to May 1970. See infra Part I for further discussion. 
 4. See, e.g., Robert B. Semple Jr., Warren E. Burger Named Chief Justice by Nixon; 
Now on Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 1 (discussing Burger nomination in 
relation to President Nixon’s interest in strict constructionist Justices); David E. Rosen-
baum, Nixon Said to Cut High Court List to Three Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1970, at 1 
(discussing possible Blackmun nomination in same context).  
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part of the selection process, and the political branches’ reliance on 
this background reflects an understanding that the Supreme Court’s 
judgments embody important choices on matters of public policy as 
well as on the rule of law. In addition, when attempting to evaluate 
judicial merit, we should recognize the relevance and importance of 
nonquantitative factors, including collegiality and career diversity. 
The Choi and Gulati approach inevitably overlooks or undervalues 
such qualitative elements. 
I.   COMPARING POTENTIAL AND REFLECTING ON PERFORMANCE 
 Professors Choi and Gulati have identified a set of objective 
measures they would like to see employed when comparing appellate 
judges for potential elevation to the Supreme Court. These measures 
focus on three categories: productivity in generating impressive 
numbers of published opinions, quality of written opinions as re-
flected in frequency of citations outside one’s own circuit, and inde-
pendence from the views of one’s colleagues and political sponsors as 
manifested through patterns of dissents and concurrences authored.5 
While recognizing that the assignment of proper weights within and 
between these categories presents some challenges, Choi and Gulati 
maintain that the three measures should at minimum form a valu-
able basis for evaluating claims of merit made by Presidents on be-
half of their Supreme Court nominees.6  
 Rather than critique the details of the Choi and Gulati approach, I 
borrow from their three categories to develop a comparison that bet-
ter suits my focus on two judges during an earlier time period.7 I 
make some minor adjustments or refinements in the three measure-
ment categories,8 while attempting to be faithful to the spirit of the 
Choi and Gulati enterprise. 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 42-43, 48-50, 61-63 (discuss-
ing the three measures). 
 6. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 310-11; Choi & Gulati, Empirical 
Ranking, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
 7. In general, I have examined the records of Judges Burger and Blackmun over a 
greater number of years than the three year time frame relied on by Choi and Gulati, and 
have focused only on the circuits in which Burger and Blackmun served during that longer 
period. Given time and space constraints, I cover far fewer judges than do Choi and Gulati, 
and my treatment of their three factors is less elaborate.  
 8. For instance, Choi and Gulati focus on published rather than unpublished opin-
ions when assessing productivity. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 42-
43. That distinction is of some consequence in an era when federal appellate courts publish 
only twenty percent of their dispositions on the merits. See Deborah Jones Merritt & 
James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 75-76 (2001). It is not relevant, however, to appel-
late judging during the 1950s and 1960s, when all written opinions were published in the 
Federal Reporter. See Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Ju-
dicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 121-25 (1994) (describing 
appellate court publication norms prior to 1973). 
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A.   The Output-Based Potential of Judges Burger and Blackmun 
 Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun had remarkably similar 
backgrounds before ascending to the Supreme Court. Each was 
raised in modest financial circumstances in St. Paul, Minnesota, 
where they were childhood friends.9 Each came from a moderately 
conservative Protestant, Republican family tradition.10 Each was 
chosen by President Eisenhower to join the federal appellate bench.11 
After more than a decade of appellate court tenure, each was nomi-
nated by President Nixon and then confirmed to serve on the Su-
preme Court.12  
 When their performances as appellate court judges are considered 
under the Choi and Gulati criteria, Burger appears to have some-
what more potential than Blackmun. The fact that Blackmun is gen-
erally regarded as a more distinguished Supreme Court Justice may 
not have been foreseeable at all. Yet, to the extent that hindsight of-
fers some perspective regarding the reasons for their divergence, the 
three quantitative measures proposed by Choi and Gulati are of little 
help; in one instance they may well be counterproductive. If any-
thing, it would seem that available qualitative evidence might have 
served as a more useful signpost of what was to come. 
1.   Productivity in Opinion Writing 
 The first Choi and Gulati category is productivity based on pub-
lished opinions. I compared the number of published majority opin-
ions13 authored by Judges Burger and Blackmun to the number of 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Linda Greenhouse, Nixon Appointee Eased Supreme Court Away from Liberal 
Era, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1 (describing Burger’s childhood circumstances); Ste-
phen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 183, 
184 (1988) (describing Blackmun’s childhood circumstances). 
 10. See Greenhouse, supra note 9 (describing Burger’s pre-judicial experiences on be-
half of Junior Chamber of Commerce and Republican governor of Minnesota); Pamela S. 
Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun and the Out-
siders, 71 N.D. L. REV. 173, 173 (1995) (referring to Blackmun as a “‘White Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant Republican Rotarian Harvard Man from the Suburbs’” (quoting Harold Hongju 
Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 
HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 51 (1985))). 
 11. See W.E. Burger Sworn as Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1956, at 10 (reporting Bur-
ger appointment); Lawyer Named for U.S. Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1959, at 33 (report-
ing Blackmun nomination). 
 12. See Senate Confirms Burger by 74 to 3, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1969, at 1; Warren 
Weaver Jr., Blackmun Approved, 94-0; Nixon Hails Vote by Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
1970, at 1. 
 13. Choi and Gulati report on both total number of published majority opinions and 
total number of published opinions overall, which includes concurrences and dissents. See 
Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 44 tbl.2. I address only majority opin-
ions here; discussion of dissents and concurrences is confined to the “independence” factor, 
in part to avoid overvaluing these separate opinions as integral parts of two categories. 
Published majority opinions were identified through a LEXIS search for the circuit court 
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majority opinions published by every other active status judge serv-
ing on their respective circuits for some or all of the same time peri-
ods. Thus, Burger served for twelve full calendar years (1957-1968) 
as an active status judge on the D.C. Circuit; Table 1 compares his 
productivity to that of all other active status judges who served on 
the D.C. Circuit between 1957 and 1968.14 Similarly, Table 1 com-
pares Blackmun’s productivity as an active status judge during his 
ten full calendar years (1960-1969) to the productivity of all other ac-
tive status judges who served on the Eighth Circuit between 1960 
and 1969. Comparisons within each circuit are based on a standard-
ized productivity score calculated for each individual judge.15 
                                                                                                                     
on which each judge served during each calendar year in which the judge was on active 
status for all twelve months. Cross-checks with Westlaw revealed that LEXIS was more 
accurate in identifying opinion authors during this period. In developing lists of citation-
receiving opinions for use in Table 2, see infra app., I cross-checked many judges’ majority 
opinion numbers with Westlaw and, for Judge Blackmun, with the appendix to his Su-
preme Court confirmation hearing record, see infra note 71. 
 Including published concurrences and dissents as part of a productivity measure raises 
an additional problem in today’s circumstances; publication of separate opinions may well 
be determined derivatively based on whether the majority opinion is deemed worthy of 
publication. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 8, at 107 (noting that appellate courts de-
termined not to publish almost fifteen percent of decisions that included a dissenting opin-
ion and nearly six percent of decisions that contained a concurring opinion, for a dataset of 
cases decided between 1986 and 1993). Choi and Gulati may not have accounted for this 
problem. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 43 (assuming that judges 
who author unpublished majority opinions “affirmatively do not want [them] to be used by 
others as precedents”). 
 14. See infra app., tbl.1. I confined the comparisons to judges who served for full cal-
endar years in an effort to standardize units of measurement. For instance, Judge Burger 
served for parts of two other years (1956 and 1969) and published opinions during those 
years, but it seemed appropriate to eliminate the impact of production during unequal 
numbers of months and also to minimize effects associated with the initiation period or 
with the consequences of an unplanned promotion-related departure. My comparisons were 
with active status judges to avoid reliance on senior status or visiting judges sitting by des-
ignation, whose opinion assignments may have been less uniform. See James J. Brudney & 
Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 581-84 (2001) (describing the modest opinion-writing role of desig-
nated district judges over seven year period).  
 15. Standardized productivity scores were computed by taking each judge’s number of 
majority opinions and subtracting the circuit’s mean for that year; the result was then di-
vided by the standard deviation. See DAVID S. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND 
CONTROVERSIES 251-53 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing standard scores). A score of zero would 
indicate that the judge’s opinion-writing frequency was at the mean level. Table 1, infra 
app., presents the average productivity score for each judge based on the number of full-
time active years he served during our period of measurement. See supra note 14. (Figures 
for individual years are on file with the author. Cory Smidt provided valuable assistance in 
calculating the standardized productivity scores.) Professors Choi and Gulati use a some-
what different approach to capturing variations within a circuit; they adjust for intercir-
cuit differences based on the mean number of opinions published for judges of each circuit. 
See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 45-46. The Choi and Gulati ap-
proach was less practicable here, given my focus on only two circuits for a period well in 
excess of three years. See supra note 7. 
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 Although Judges Burger and Blackmun published majority opin-
ions at similar rates, Burger’s relative standing on productivity 
among his D.C. Circuit colleagues is considerably higher than 
Blackmun’s in the Eighth Circuit. Judge Burger authored 254 pub-
lished majorities from 1957 to 1968, or 21.17 per year. His standard-
ized productivity score of 0.63 ranked him second overall among the 
fourteen judges serving during this period and first in comparison 
with judges who were on active status for the same number of 
years.16 
 Judge Blackmun produced 210 majority opinions from 1960 to 
1969, or 21 per year. However, Blackmun’s performance was merely 
average in relation to his circuit court peers. Blackmun’s standard-
ized productivity score of 0.01 ranked him sixth out of the twelve 
judges serving during this period and last among the judges who 
served for the same number of years that he did.17  
 Appellate courts published all majority opinions authored during 
the period in which Judges Burger and Blackmun served, and the 
differences in productivity among judges within each circuit appear 
to be less dramatic than those identified by Choi and Gulati.18 This 
narrower range presumably reflects in part the tendency to distrib-
ute opinion assignments on a relatively equitable basis among three-
member panels. When four out of every five circuit court panel deci-
sions are unpublished—as is true today—there is likely to be far 
more variation in individual judges’ rates of publication within their 
own circuit. Of course, a major reason for this variation may well be 
the opinion assignment practices of a panel’s most senior or “rank-
ing” member. By retaining the few publication-worthy cases for 
themselves, these panel members can influence productivity figures 
in ways that Choi and Gulati may need to anticipate.19 In addition, 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See infra app., tbl.1. Judge Leventhal, the only judge with a higher score, served 
only three years during this twelve year period. Notably, in six of the twelve years, Burger 
produced majority opinions at a number more than one standard deviation above the cir-
cuit mean. 
 17. See infra app., tbl.1. Unlike Judge Burger, Blackmun’s productivity was never 
more than one standard deviation above the circuit mean during his ten year period. 
 18. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 86-89 tbl.B (noting that in 
Seventh Circuit from 1998 to 2000, Judge Posner published 254 majority opinions and 
Judge Manion published 102). Using the ten Seventh Circuit judges in Choi and Gulati’s 
tournament as a baseline, Posner’s output exceeded the circuit mean of 168 published ma-
jorities by 51% while Judge Manion’s total of 102 published majorities was 39% below the 
circuit mean. See id. For our comparable 1964-1966 period, the top judge in the D.C. Cir-
cuit exceeded his circuit mean by 23% while the bottom judge was 25% below the mean; in 
the Eighth Circuit, the top judge exceeded that circuit’s mean by 16% while the bottom 
judge fell 7% below the mean. (Copies of all calculations are on file with author.) 
 19. Given the traditional practice that the senior active status member of each panel 
controls opinion assignments, it seems worth exploring whether judges who most often 
have the assignment power tend to produce unusually high numbers of published opinions 
within a circuit. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of 
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Choi and Gulati’s focus on only three years of opinion writing proba-
bly exaggerates productivity differences among judges when com-
pared with the ten and twelve year periods examined here.20 
 Nonetheless, even in an earlier era of universal publication, and 
measuring for productivity over a longer period of time, some judges 
were distinctly more productive than others within their own circuit. 
In this regard, Judge Burger was unusually prolific in generating 
majority opinions when compared to others on the D.C. Circuit. By 
contrast, Judge Blackmun was not unproductive, but his perform-
ance on the Eighth Circuit qualifies him as no better than average.  
2.   Quality of Opinion Writing 
 Choi and Gulati recommend citation counts as a proxy for the 
quality of the appellate judicial product.21 They contend that judges 
whose opinions help explain the law more clearly or effectively, or 
who develop a reputation for quality analysis outside their own cir-
cuit, will receive more citations.22 Borrowing from their approach, I 
compiled the citations received for majority opinions published by 
Judges Burger and Blackmun during a four year period when they 
were both serving on the appellate bench, from 1963 to 1966. I also 
compiled citations for the four other D.C. Circuit judges who were on 
active status during all four of those years and for the three other 
Eighth Circuit judges who served throughout the same four year pe-
                                                                                                                     
Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1040 n.14 (2000) (describing stan-
dard practice of the senior judge on panel assigning opinions); Harry T. Edwards, The Ef-
fects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1665 (2003) 
(same). Judges who control opinion assignments can also begin drafting majorities even be-
fore oral argument, knowing that they will reserve one or more particular opinions for 
themselves. 
 20. Productivity is more likely to be volatile within a three year period; average pro-
duction tends to flatten out over a longer time frame. For example, Judge Burger’s produc-
tivity varied over his D.C. Circuit career—it was as high as 26.7 majorities per year from 
1960-1962 and as low as 14 per year from 1964-1966. It is not unreasonable to infer that 
Judge Leventhal’s three year productivity average of 29.0, see infra app., tbl.1, might ex-
ceed his performance when measured over a more extended period. 
 21. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 306-07; Choi & Gulati, Empirical 
Ranking, supra note 1, at 49-50. 
 22. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 48-50. Opinion assignment 
practices may affect citation counts just as they do publication rates. See supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. Judges who tend to control the assignment of majorities can influence 
reputations by channeling certain hot doctrinal subjects, or cutting-edge legal questions, to 
particular colleagues—or by retaining those opinions for themselves. Choi and Gulati have 
not controlled for “pretournament inherent differences” that they view as related to merit. 
Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 49 (discussing possible citation advan-
tage for judges who are better liked, on more respected circuits, or have more seniority). It 
would be useful to consider whether the power to control opinion assignments should be 
deemed merit-related in this context. 
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riod.23 For each of these judges, I gathered the total number of cita-
tions by any state or federal court outside of their own federal circuit, 
including citations by the Supreme Court.24 In addition, I compared 
the top twenty citation-receiving opinions of each judge; this tracks 
the Choi and Gulati approach of evaluating a judge’s quality based 
on her “best opinions” as well as her average performance when con-
sidering the full volume of production.25 
 As presented in Table 2,26 Judges Burger and Blackmun are re-
markably similar in terms of their volume of outside citations. For 
the 1963-1966 period, Judge Burger’s average number of citations 
per opinion based on all published majority opinions modestly ex-
ceeded Blackmun’s, 6.09 to 5.66. Conversely, with regard to citations 
per majority opinion for the twenty most frequently cited opinions, 
Blackmun’s average was slightly above Burger’s, 16.5 to 16.0. 
 Further, both Burger and Blackmun stand out from other mem-
bers of their respective circuits in terms of the recognition garnered 
for their majority opinions. Judge Blackmun’s top twenty average of 
16.5 far outpaces his Eighth Circuit colleagues; it is more than twice 
that of Judges Matthes and Van Oosterhout and nearly double that 
of Judge Vogel.27 Judge Burger is comparably impressive in the com-
pany of his D.C. Circuit colleagues. Burger’s top twenty average of 
16.0 is nearly three times that of Judge Danaher, and his top twenty 
and overall averages are well above the citation counts for his three 
other colleagues.28 Moreover, in distancing himself from Judges 
Bazelon and Wright, Burger’s performance on citation counts ranks 
him comfortably ahead of two nationally renowned appellate judges 
of the era. 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Although time constraints made it impracticable to compile lists of outside-circuit 
citations for all individual judges, the judicial colleagues selected provide a suitable in-
tracircuit framework for discussion. 
 24. Sara Sampson, research librarian at The Ohio State University Moritz College of 
Law, compiled the citation counts, using “custom restrictions” within LEXIS’s Shepard’s 
Service to provide individual cases. The “outside circuit” citations include cases cited by the 
Supreme Court but do not include federal cases within a judge’s own circuit—that is, no 
district court cases from the D.C. Circuit are included for Judge Burger or his four col-
leagues and none from districts within the Eighth Circuit for Judge Blackmun or his three 
colleagues. Citations were to all outside opinions through May 31, 1969. This parallels the 
Choi and Gulati approach of tracking 1998-2000 opinions cited through May 31, 2003, Choi 
& Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 50, although I have included four years of 
majority opinions instead of only three. The date of May 31, 1969, is also convenient be-
cause Judge Burger was nominated to the Supreme Court in late May; any cites after May 
31, 1969, may reflect in part the perception of Burger, and eventually Blackmun, as Su-
preme Court Justices.  
 25. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 54. 
 26. See infra app., tbl.2.  
 27. See infra app., tbl.2. Blackmun’s overall citation average also far exceeds the av-
erages for his three colleagues who served as active judges throughout this same four year 
period. 
 28. See infra app., tbl.2. 
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 An additional issue is whether any difference existed between the 
two circuits in terms of their outside recognition. Based on this ad-
mittedly selective sample, it appears that D.C. Circuit judges are 
cited more often by courts outside their own circuit.29 There are a 
number of reasons why the D.C. Circuit might have enjoyed such an 
advantage during this time period. From a subject matter stand-
point, that court has long been the primary venue for judicial review 
of agency action, handling an unusually large volume of administra-
tive law cases.30 During the 1960s, it also had jurisdiction to review 
general criminal matters under the D.C. Code.31 Perhaps judges from 
other circuits were more likely to look to the D.C. Circuit as a source 
of doctrinal insight in the administrative law and criminal law areas, 
something less obviously available from the Eighth Circuit.32 It also 
is possible that judges elsewhere in the country simply perceived the 
D.C. Circuit as “higher status” in general terms and looked more of-
ten to its majority opinions for guidance.33 Still, under the Choi and 
Gulati model, service on a more respected circuit counts as a positive 
factor; it is the circuit’s reputation for high quality work, and the in-
dividual judge’s ability supporting such a reputation, that warrant 
preferential consideration in the tournament.34 Judge Burger’s top 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Omitting Judge Blackmun, the Eighth Circuit average for citation-receiving opin-
ions among judges on active status for these four years is 3.08 citations per opinion consid-
ering all majorities and 8.53 per opinion considering top twenty majorities. Excepting 
Judge Burger, the D.C. Circuit average for active status judges is 3.49 citations per opinion 
considering all majorities and 9.21 per opinion considering top twenty majorities. Also re-
vealing is the fact that three of the four D.C. Circuit judges (besides Burger) approached or 
exceeded ten citations per opinion for their top twenty opinions, whereas only one of three 
Eighth Circuit judges (other than Blackmun) even approached that level. See infra app., 
tbl.2. 
 30. Numerous federal statutes confer automatic jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit for re-
view of agency action. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1)(A) (2000) (review of Federal Trade 
Commission regulations); id. § 77i(a) (review of Securities Exchange Commission orders); 
29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (review of decisions by National Labor Relations Board).  
 31. Cf. District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 
111, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (expanding local D.C. courts and removing local criminal jurisdiction 
from D.C. Circuit). See generally John W. Kern, III, The District of Columbia Court Reor-
ganization Act of 1970: A Dose of the Conventional Wisdom and a Dash of Innovation, 20 
AM. U. L. REV. 237, 241-42 (1970-1971). 
 32. Of Judge Burger’s top twenty citation-receiving opinions in the 1963-1966 period, 
seven were administrative law decisions and thirteen were criminal law opinions. 
 33. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 1-2 
(1999) (discussing origins of D.C. Circuit’s pre-1970s reputation as a “mini Supreme 
Court”); Neil A. Lewis, Democrats and Republicans Trade Accusations at Confirmation 
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A23 (observing that “the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit [is] widely viewed as second in importance only to the Supreme Court”). 
 34. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 49. Choi and Gulati also 
consider the possibility that high citation rates may reflect the controversial or outrageous 
nature of an opinion rather than the quality of its analysis. Id. at 54-55. They recommend 
examining negative citations to the top twenty citation-receiving opinions as a safeguard. 
Id. at 55-57. There are virtually no such negative citations by courts for the Burger and 
Blackmun majorities published during our four year period. Using LEXIS’s Shepard’s Ser-
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performance on such a prestigious court may therefore be worthy of 
extra respect. 
 Finally, one intriguing aspect of Judge Blackmun’s record on cita-
tions is that five of his top twenty citation-receiving opinions involve 
the tax field.35 Blackmun practiced tax law for many years before 
joining the federal bench,36 and the widespread recognition for his tax 
law decisions presumably reflects the value of that pre-judicial ex-
perience. Blackmun’s Supreme Court career also distinguished him 
as a highly respected voice on federal tax law issues;37 in this con-
tent-specific respect, his appellate court performance may have sig-
naled Supreme Court potential. 
3.   Independence in Opinion Writing 
 Choi and Gulati maintain that a judge’s willingness to disagree 
publicly with her colleagues on the appellate bench, especially col-
leagues who are presumptively like-minded, is a valuable predictor of 
judicial independence.38 They identify two distinct components of ju-
dicial independence that deserve assessment. As a measure of special 
intellectual effort expended and simple willingness to differ from 
one’s colleagues, they value the number of separate opinions (dis-
sents and concurrences) that a judge authors.39 As an indicator of 
ideological autonomy, they place additional emphasis on these dis-
sents and concurrences if the judge’s “separation” was from panel 
members of her own political party.40 
 Table 341 indicates that Judge Burger wrote 130 dissents and con-
currences, far more than the eighteen authored by Judge Blackmun 
                                                                                                                     
vice—searching for questioned, criticized, overruled (wholly or in part), or disapproved—
resulted in identification of three negative cites for Burger majorities, only one of which 
was outside the circuit, and three negative cites for Blackmun majorities, two from outside 
the circuit.  
 35. See Gen. Bancshares Corp. v. Comm’r, 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964); Hamm v. 
Comm’r, 325 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1963); Estate of Peyton v. Comm’r, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 
1963); Banks v. Comm’r, 322 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1963); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 
451 (8th Cir. 1963). 
 36. Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 109, 112 (1998) (reporting that Blackmun specialized in taxation during six-
teen years of private practice). 
 37. Id. at 110 (discussing Blackmun’s extraordinary reputation in this area among tax 
lawyers and academics). 
 38. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 310; Choi & Gulati, Empirical Rank-
ing, supra note 1, at 62. 
 39. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 62. 
 40. Id. at 63. Choi and Gulati also consider dissents written against the judge in order 
to assess in a more refined way the extent to which each judge opposed a judge of the same 
political party. See id. Their evaluations of independence based on dissents and concur-
rences are more extensive than what I am able to present here, although I do discuss dis-
sents from Burger and Blackmun majorities. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra app., tbl.3.  
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during comparable periods on the appellate bench. The large differ-
ential must be understood in the context of their distinct circuit cul-
tures. During this period, the D.C. Circuit was a contentious place; 
judges wrote dissenting or concurring opinions much more frequently 
than was true for their colleagues on the Eighth Circuit.42 It may 
therefore be appropriate in one sense to view Burger and Blackmun 
as displaying comparable independence within their respective cir-
cuit court spheres. Each judge authored more dissents and concur-
rences than the average for his circuit as a whole: Burger ranked 
fourth among fourteen D.C. Circuit judges in separate opinions writ-
ten per year of service, while Blackmun placed fifth among twelve 
Eighth Circuit judges on this scale.43 Still, the six-fold difference be-
tween Burger and Blackmun in annual number of separate opinions 
reflects a considerably greater investment of intellectual effort on 
Burger’s part. Circuit norms may help account for the size of this 
gap, but the differential itself is tangible and robust.  
 As Choi and Gulati recognize, circuits may vary considerably 
among each other or over time in terms of their partisan composition, 
making it difficult to assess an individual judge’s autonomy from cir-
                                                                                                                     
 42. See infra app., tbl.3 (indicating that D.C. Circuit judges on average wrote dissents 
nearly seven times as often as Eighth Circuit judges (6.32 per “judge year” versus 0.93) 
and that they authored concurrences nearly eight times as often (3.20 per “judge year” ver-
sus 0.42)). The contentiousness among D.C. Circuit judges becomes even clearer when con-
sidering the fact that the Eighth Circuit judges actually produced slightly more majority 
opinions on average than their D.C. Circuit counterparts. See infra app., tbl.3 (indicating 
that Eighth Circuit judges produced 20.5 majorities per “judge year” compared to 18.1 ma-
jorities per “judge year” for D.C. Circuit judges). For a more detailed treatment of the un-
usually high levels of conflict on the D.C. Circuit during this period, see Charles M. Lamb, 
A Microlevel Analysis of Appeals Court Conflict: Warren Burger and His Colleagues on the 
D.C. Circuit, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN 
APPELLATE COURTS 179 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986) (analyzing ef-
fects of party and religion in explaining patterns of conflict between Burger and his col-
leagues). 
 43. Over his twelve years as an active status judge, Burger averaged 10.8 separate 
opinions per year, compared to the D.C. Circuit average of 9.51 separate opinions per 
“judge year.” During his ten years of active status duty, Blackmun averaged 1.8 separate 
opinions a year, as opposed to the Eighth Circuit average of 1.34. Burger’s comparative re-
cord is perhaps more impressive because he wrote more majorities than did Blackmun, 
relative to circuit norms, and thus had somewhat fewer opportunities to write separately. 
See infra app., tbl.3. 
 Although a standardized score was used for majority opinions, see infra app., tbl.1, such 
a measure is not as applicable for dissents and concurrences. When implementing a stan-
dardized score, one assumes the observed outcomes are generated by a normal distribu-
tion. In the Eighth Circuit, however, judges often did not write a separate opinion for the 
entire year. A substantial part of the estimated distribution would therefore exist below 
zero, and the censoring of observations at zero would result in bias in the observed mean 
and standard deviation. A standardized score would not have this problem for the D.C. 
Circuit based on annual outputs of separate opinions, but the utility of this score would be 
limited inasmuch as circuit comparisons cannot be made. Accordingly, a simple average 
score was used in Table 1, see infra app. See generally MOORE, supra note 15, at 248-55 
(discussing relationship between standard scores and normal distributions). 
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cuit court colleagues who are appointed by a President of the same 
political party.44 Measuring partisan autonomy was also a challenge 
in this setting; I did not attempt to gather comprehensive data on 
panel compositions by party for every judge on the D.C. and Eighth 
Circuits. While the record on political autonomy is thus less than 
complete, the evidence I did assemble on Judges Burger and Black-
mun illustrates some of the difficulties involved in the Choi and Gu-
lati approach to measuring such autonomy.  
 During Judge Burger’s years on the D.C. Circuit, most of his col-
leagues were Democratic appointees: among his seven to eight fellow 
active status judges, there were never more than two appointed by 
Republican Presidents.45 It is therefore not terribly surprising that 
sixty-eight of his seventy dissents were from majority opinions writ-
ten by Democratic appointees; for only eleven of these seventy dis-
sents was there even a “panel majority” of Republicans, meaning a 
second Republican besides Burger himself.46 
 Judge Blackmun belonged to a more politically balanced court of 
appeals. In his ten full years on the Eighth Circuit, Blackmun served 
mostly with Republican appointees during his early years and mostly 
with Democratic appointees in his later period.47 The less partisan 
context of Blackmun’s eleven dissents reflects this relatively bal-
anced circuit court composition: four dissents were from all-
Republican majorities, two were from all-Democratic majorities, and 
the other five were from “mixed” majorities of one Republican and 
one Democratic appointee. The fact that the Eighth Circuit had a less 
partisan “edge” may also help explain why there were notably fewer 
dissents or concurrences published in response to Blackmun majori-
ties than was the case for majorities authored by Burger.48  
                                                                                                                     
 44. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 310 n.29. 
 45. Of the eighty-nine active status “judge years” served by Burger’s colleagues, see 
infra app., tbl.3, sixty-nine (78%) were by Democratic appointees and only twenty (22%) 
were by Republican appointees. Panel composition was even more heavily Democratic 
given that five of the six D.C. Circuit judges who served on senior status were Democratic 
appointees. Thus, the odds of having an all-Republican or even majority-Republican panel 
were extraordinarily low.  
 46. In fifty-nine of seventy decisions, Burger dissented from a majority joined by ei-
ther two Democrat-appointed panel members or (in nine en banc cases) a majority com-
posed overwhelmingly of Democrat-appointed judges. In ten other decisions, the majority 
triggering Burger’s dissent consisted of one Democrat and one Republican appointee. The 
one dissent that Burger authored from an all-Republican majority was in Price Broadcast-
ers, Inc. v. FCC, 295 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., dissenting).  
 47. Of the fifty-seven active status “judge years” served by Blackmun’s colleagues, 
twenty-eight (49.1%) were by Republican appointees and twenty-nine (50.9%) were by De-
mocratic appointees. See infra app., tbl.3. 
 48. Judge Blackmun’s 210 majorities drew a total of five dissents and five concur-
rences from his active status Eighth Circuit colleagues. By contrast, Judge Burger’s 254 
majorities elicited thirty-one concurrences and fifty-eight dissents by judges on the D.C. 
Circuit. Four of the five dissents to Blackmun came from Democratic appointees; fifty-four 
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 A closer look at some details regarding the eleven Blackmun dis-
sents suggests ways in which the partisan classification scheme be-
comes problematic. One Republican appointee from whose majority 
opinions Blackmun dissented on four occasions was appointed to the 
federal trial bench by President Roosevelt and elevated to the appel-
late court by President Eisenhower after thirteen years as a Democ-
ratic appointee.49 There is some question as to whether this judge’s 
partisan label should differ from that of a “pure” Republican ap-
pointee. Moreover, in at least two of his four dissents from all-
Republican majority decisions, Blackmun’s opinion disagrees with 
the “liberal” position adopted by his Republican colleagues.50 When 
Choi and Gulati place special value on a judge’s autonomy in being 
willing to risk the displeasure of like-minded colleagues, they would 
seem to have in mind the judge’s departure from a shared partisan-
related ideology, not its reinforcement. Accordingly, Blackmun’s re-
cord of dissents as evidencing political autonomy is at best ambigu-
ous. 
 Turning to a less quantitative perspective, Judge Burger’s pro-
pensity to express himself through dissenting opinions was viewed by 
the political branches as a sign of positive Supreme Court potential. 
At his confirmation hearing, Senators approvingly referred to and 
quoted from five separate Burger dissents that had addressed con-
troversies involving matters of criminal procedure, mental health 
                                                                                                                     
of the fifty-eight dissents to Burger were written by Democratic appointees. (Data compila-
tions indicating the number of dissents and concurrences by individual judges to Blackmun 
majorities and Burger majorities are on file with the author.) 
 49. Judge Vogel is the judge referred to in text. He authored three majorities from 
which Blackmun dissented and was listed as lead judge on a per curiam majority that elic-
ited a Blackmun dissent. Two of these four majorities were “pure” Republican and the 
other two were mixed majorities of a Republican and a Democrat. 
 50. See Bookwalter v. Phelps, 325 F.2d 186, 189-91 (8th Cir. 1963) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (dissenting from decision affirming district court judgment in estate tax case that 
widow’s allowance qualified for marital deduction; Blackmun would have reconstrued ap-
plicable state law to take deduction away from the surviving spouse); Kroger Co. v. Doane, 
280 F.2d 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1960) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision that af-
firmed jury verdict favoring plaintiff in diversity action for negligence; Blackmun con-
tended it was reversible error not to submit defendant’s jury instruction on contributory 
negligence). The two other cases in which Blackmun dissented from majorities joined by 
two Republican appointees are more difficult to categorize on a liberal-conservative spec-
trum. See Wm. F. Crome & Co. v. Vendo Co., 299 F.2d 852, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1962) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision affirming district court judgment of patent 
infringement; Blackmun viewed evidence of inventiveness as inadequate to warrant patent 
protection); United States v. Wiley’s Cove Ranch, 295 F.2d 436, 446-52 (8th Cir. 1961) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from decision affirming district court holding that 
payments for livestock feed under Emergency Feed Program were properly certified by a 
county committee of Farmers’ Home Administration; Blackmun would have allowed for 
more searching review by Department of Agriculture of circumstances surrounding county 
committee’s certification).  
1028  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1015 
 
law, and school desegregation.51 Taking their cue from President 
Nixon’s stated intention to appoint “strict constructionists” to the 
Supreme Court,52 several Senators praised Burger for dissents that 
suggested to them a willingness to help rein in Warren Court activ-
ism in areas of criminal law and separation of powers.53 
 Given the strongly Democratic complexion of the appellate court 
on which Burger served, the fact that his disagreements were almost 
always with Democratic appointees, while virtually inevitable, may 
well not satisfy the Choi and Gulati autonomy measure for judges 
taking an unbiased approach to individual cases.54 Still, the fre-
quency and clangor of these disagreements do suggest that Burger 
had the courage of his convictions in a largely hostile doctrinal envi-
ronment, as well as a determination to exert extra effort to voice 
those convictions—traits that register as positives on the Choi and 
Gulati scale.55 
 This abbreviated comparison between two appellate judges is 
hardly meant to be definitive. I have not evaluated Judges Burger or 
Blackmun in the more detailed context of how appellate judges from 
all circuits conducted themselves individually during the same time 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Nomination of Warren E. Burger, of Virginia, to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 5-6 (1969) [hereinafter 
Burger Hearing] (remarks of Sen. McClellan, referring with approval to Burger dissents in 
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc), and Frazier v. United 
States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); id. at 7 (remarks of Sen. Ervin, referring with ap-
proval to Burger dissent in Frazier); id. at 15-16 (remarks of Sen. H. Byrd, referring with 
approval to Burger dissents in Frazier, Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 
1968), Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc)). By contrast, the Senators questioning Burger referred to only 
one of his majority opinions. See id. at 7 (remarks of Sen. Ervin, referring with approval to 
Burger majority in Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). 
 52. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. H. Byrd, referring to Burger’s judicial record as consis-
tent with the President’s philosophical expectations for Supreme Court appointees); see su-
pra note 4. 
 53. Burger Hearing, supra note 51, at 3 (statement of Sen. H. Byrd); id. at 7 (remarks 
of Sen. Ervin); id. at 15-16 (remarks of Sen. H. Byrd); see also 115 CONG. REC. 15,176 
(1969) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen, praising Judge Burger’s “courage and conviction” as evi-
denced in his “many concurring and dissenting opinions”); id. at 15,179 (remarks of Sen. 
Holland, identifying with Judge Burger’s philosophy as “firmly worded and firmly ex-
pressed” in his dissenting opinions). Whether these dissents were written in part to cam-
paign for a future seat on the Supreme Court is a question beyond the scope of this Essay, 
although the Choi and Gulati approach might well encourage such strategic judicial behav-
ior. See generally Julius Duscha, Chief Justice Burger Asks: ‘If It Doesn’t Make Good Sense, 
How Can It Make Good Law?,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1969, §6 (Magazine), at 30 (reporting 
that in 1967, a mutual friend of Richard Nixon and Warren Burger told Burger of Nixon’s 
favorable reaction to a Burger speech criticizing two Warren Court decisions that had ex-
panded the rights of criminal defendants).  
 54. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 310 n.29 (focusing on dissents 
from politically like-minded judges as indicating lack of bias). 
 55. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 62 (extolling extra effort 
and willingness to displease colleagues). 
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period. Overall, though, Judge Burger emerges as a candidate of 
somewhat greater potential under the Choi and Gulati approach. 
Burger’s productivity in publishing majority opinions exceeded 
Blackmun’s. His majority opinions were cited by other circuits at the 
same rate as Blackmun’s. It is true that Blackmun’s citation num-
bers are high for his Circuit, but Burger’s favorable average com-
pared to his nationally respected circuit court peers stands out even 
more. Further, Burger’s persistent authorship of dissents and con-
currences would more clearly establish his capacity for independence 
under the Choi and Gulati framework. 
B.   The Supreme Court Performance of Justices Burger and 
Blackmun 
 In considering the Supreme Court careers of these two long-
serving Justices, I focus on one aspect of each man’s record, an aspect 
that suggests how difficult it is to predict future Supreme Court be-
havior based on the Choi and Gulati appellate court performance cri-
teria.56 For Burger, the independence factor turns out to be norma-
tively troubling. Judge Burger’s appellate court record of authoring 
numerous dissents and concurrences appears in retrospect to have 
signaled an aloofness from colleagues and a lack of consensus-
building capability amply demonstrated during his tenure as Chief 
Justice. For Blackmun, the fact that he changed substantially in doc-
trinal and ideological terms while a member of the Supreme Court is 
closely linked to the recognition he has received as a Justice. Black-
mun’s evolution, however, seems wholly unrelated to his measurable 
outputs as a member of the Eighth Circuit. 
1.   Justice Burger and Separate Opinions 
 I have noted Judge Burger’s propensity for publishing dissents 
and concurrences while serving on the D.C. Circuit; in addition to ex-
ceeding the “independent” expression of almost all his circuit col-
leagues, his record of dissents attracted the approving attention of 
the executive and legislative branches. With hindsight, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 56. I do not compare the two Justices’ Supreme Court records based on the Choi and 
Gulati performance factors. While it would be possible to do so, such comparisons inevita-
bly would raise additional questions. For instance, Burger published more majority opin-
ions than Blackmun during the sixteen Terms they served together (243 to 219). See Table 
I(A) at the back of issue one (the annual Supreme Court review issue) of the Harvard Law 
Review, volumes 85 through 100. One could debate whether increases in individual produc-
tivity are more of a virtue on appellate courts that frequently confront caseload backlogs 
than on a Supreme Court that necessarily clears its calendar every year. Even assuming, 
however, that the modest differential between the two Justices (15.2 versus 13.7 per Term) 
constitutes a “productivity advantage” for Burger, the advantage may well be due to rea-
sons unrelated to merit, such as Burger’s control over opinion assignments and the in-
creasingly strained professional and personal relations between the two men. 
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Judge Burger’s inclination to write separate opinions seems more re-
flective of a standoffish and at times insensitive judicial style than of 
the unbiased deliberative approach anticipated under the Choi and 
Gulati framework. From a doctrinal standpoint, Burger remained 
reasonably consistent in his wary stance toward the rights of crimi-
nal defendants,57 but his record is more fitful or uneven in certain 
other areas of the law.58 More broadly, the Burger Court has been 
criticized for a legacy of “rootless activism” and the absence of an 
identifiable agenda or set of values.59 It may be unfair to expect that 
any Chief Justice could have imposed a coherent philosophy or direc-
tion on the Court during such a divisive period of intellectual and po-
litical ferment in the larger society.60 Nonetheless, Burger’s “inde-
pendent” judicial approach and style were not conducive to promot-
ing collegiality or building consensus. 
 By viewing a greater volume of separate appellate court opinions 
as a fundamentally positive indicator, Choi and Gulati expect that a 
judge’s willingness to express her views independently will enhance 
the objectivity of judicial decisionmaking.61 Although this judicial 
willingness may reflect a neutral sensibility and intellectual forti-
tude that can improve the quality of the deliberative enterprise, a ju-
dicial appetite for independent expression may additionally or alter-
natively promote disharmony and lack of cohesion on an appellate 
court. The prospects for divisiveness may increase if the judge’s insis-
tence on the importance of separate expression is carried over to his 
new role as Chief Justice on the Supreme Court—where the contro-
versies are closer, the stakes are higher, and judges participate con-
tinuously with the same colleagues in the dynamic of shared deci-
sionmaking. 
 Burger himself seems not to have anticipated the magnitude of 
his transition to the Supreme Court. As he told the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, “I would conceive my judicial duties to be essentially the 
same, basically the same as they have been as a member of the U.S. 
court of appeals—deciding cases.”62 Consistent with that vision, Bur-
                                                                                                                     
 57. See Timothy P. O’Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court: Victims’ Rights 
and a New Model of Criminal Review, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 379-82 (1984); 
Staci Rosche, Note, How Conservative Is the Rehnquist Court? Three Issues, One Answer, 
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2717-18 (1997).  
 58. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1437-42 (1987); Phillip Craig Zane, An Interpretation of the Jurispru-
dence of Chief Justice Warren Burger, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 975, 1003-05.  
 59. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 58, at 1437; Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of 
the Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 198 
(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 315, 318 (1984) (book review). 
 60. See Alschuler, supra note 58, at 1454; Nichol, supra note 59, at 323-24. 
 61. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 62. 
 62. Burger Hearing, supra note 51, at 5.  
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ger as Chief Justice continued to voice his independence from his ju-
dicial colleagues. He wrote far more dissents as a percentage of his 
majorities than any Chief Justice in the modern era and similarly 
authored substantially more concurrences per majority than other 
Chief Justices over the past eighty years.63 This appetite for writing 
separately contributed to Burger’s reputation as a less than success-
ful leader of the Court; it is of a piece with descriptions of imperious 
or tactless approaches toward his colleagues that impeded the craft-
ing of consensus on a range of complex and hotly contested issues.64 
 At the appellate court level, judges are often critical of any pro-
nounced tendency to write separate opinions. They fear the erosion of 
institutional integrity that may result from a regular insistence on 
voicing one’s own doctrinal positions when compromise or acquies-
cence would yield unanimity.65 They also worry that a judicial incli-
nation to write separately may reflect a somewhat arrogant unwill-
ingness to deliberate and genuinely consider alternative views, an 
unwillingness that in turn leads to poorer work products.66 On the 
other hand, judges who regularly publish separate opinions are not 
all regarded with disfavor. There are Justices whose record of au-
thoring separate opinions is praised as a mark of commitment to un-
biased principles67 or to a consistent vision of the law.68   
                                                                                                                     
 63. See Zane, supra note 58, at 977-78, 1006-07 (reporting on number of opinions au-
thored by Chief Justices since 1921 Term). As a result of his persistent inclination to issue 
large numbers of dissents and concurrences, Burger authored more separate opinions—
dissents plus concurrences—than majorities in his seventeen years as Chief Justice, a re-
cord not remotely approached by the six other Chief Justices. Id. at 1006 tbl.I. Zane’s data 
include opinions written accompanying orders of the Court, such as those denying certio-
rari or relating to Supreme Court applications. Id. at 1006 n.213. With respect to opinions 
filed in cases briefed and argued before the Court, Justice Burger’s concurrences and dis-
sents together are nearly half (47.2%) his total output. See Table I(A) of Harvard Law Re-
view’s annual Supreme Court review issue, volumes 84 through 100. 
 64. Matthew Brelis, Court Improvements, Not Ideology, Called Main Legacy, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 26, 1995, at 1 (reporting on perceptions of Burger’s “pompous, almost regal 
attitude” that made it hard for him to build consensus); see also Mark Tushnet, Why the 
Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (1994) 
(discussing Burger’s clumsy collegial style). 
 65. See Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., What Makes a Good Appellate Judge? Four Views, 
JUDGES’ J., Spring 1983, at 14, 14-16 (views of Judge Aldisert); id. at 17 (views of Justice 
Erickson). See generally Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 1307, 1388 (1995). 
 66. See Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge of a Federal Court of Appeals, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 384-85 (1984) (discussing adverse effects on quality of opinions 
when judges do not adequately respect the viewpoints of fellow panel members). 
 67. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative 
of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 601-05 (1994) (discussing the first Justice 
Harlan’s distinguished record of dissents in civil rights cases); Anita S. Krishnakumar, On 
the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 792-802 (2000) (discussing 
canonization of dissenters Holmes, Brandeis, and the first Harlan). 
 68. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 
1221, 1232-34, 1241 (2002) (discussing Justice Black’s critical role in leading Court’s 
movement over two decades to incorporate Bill of Rights into Fourteenth Amendment); 
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Whether an appellate judge’s insistence on independent expression 
signifies a future Justice unusually free of ideological predispositions 
or uncommonly insensitive to the needs of a collegial institution is a 
question worth asking. With hindsight, one can point to reservations 
expressed at the time of Justice Burger’s nomination, indicating that 
his independent-mindedness might well adversely affect his ability to 
lead the Court.69 The nature of those doubts suggests that at bottom, 
the relationship between separate opinion writing and laudable or 
lamentable qualities of judging is a contingent one. Insights into that 
relationship are more likely to be found by examining the judge’s in-
dividual biography, his personality and temperament, and the per-
ception of his intellectual integrity among his peers than by measur-
ing his past performance on an objective scale of production. 
2.   Justice Blackmun and Evolution on the High Court 
 While Blackmun’s appellate court record scores less well than 
Burger’s under the Choi and Gulati approach, the two men were 
viewed similarly in the course of the Supreme Court appointments 
process.70 During his confirmation hearing, Blackmun was character-
ized by Senators from across the political spectrum as a judge whose 
written opinions reflected a philosophy of judicial restraint and a 
clear respect for precedent.71 There are modest indications in Black-
mun’s Eighth Circuit opinions and Senate testimony that he might 
behave on the Supreme Court in a manner less constrained than his 
                                                                                                                     
Patricia R. Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection for the Fringe, 
80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 914-17 (2000) (discussing impact of Justice Black’s absolutist ap-
proach to First Amendment). 
 69. See, e.g., Duscha, supra note 53, at 30, 148 (reporting criticism from Burger’s ex-
law partner (who had since become a state supreme court justice) that Burger’s stubborn-
ness and tenacious adherence to his convictions helped make him an excellent lawyer but 
have been liabilities for him as an appellate judge); Sidney E. Zion, Nixon’s Nominee for the 
Post of Chief Justice: Warren Earl Burger, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 36 (reporting the 
“well known [view] in the legal community that [Burger’s] professional differences with a 
majority of his [D.C. Circuit] colleagues have often been so harsh as to create a mutual dis-
respect,” and that some of his colleagues regarded him as “unsuited by talent and tem-
perament to lead the High Court”). 
 70. See Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1160, 1162 (2005) (reporting that 
Burger and Blackmun had identical “perceived ideology” scores during appointments proc-
ess and that their “perceived qualifications” were very similar, with Blackmun’s score 
marginally higher). 
 71. Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong. 2 (1970) [hereinafter Blackmun Hearing] (statement of Sen. Mondale); id. at 34 (re-
marks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 55 (remarks of Sen. H. Byrd); see also id. at 3 (statement of 
Sen. Mondale, referring to an editorial in the Rochester (Minn.) Post-Bulletin describing 
Blackmun as a “‘strict constructionist’ of the Constitution . . . [and] a man of moderate, 
commonsense views”). 
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reputation suggested,72 but the general view at the time was that 
Blackmun would make few waves on the Court and would follow the 
lead of his long-time friend Warren Burger.73 
 Of course, Justice Blackmun’s Supreme Court career departed 
dramatically from these expectations. Looking beyond his signature 
contributions in the areas of abortion74 and commercial speech,75 Jus-
tice Blackmun began by voting with Chief Justice Burger in nearly 
nine of ten decisions, but by the time Burger retired in 1986, the two 
were aligned only about one-half the time.76 Conversely, Justice 
Blackmun voted with Justices Brennan and Marshall in about 50% 
of all decisions during his first several years on the Court; by 1986, 
he was voting with each of them more than 80% of the time.77 
 This shift toward more liberal voting patterns—which continued 
over his full twenty-four-Term tenure—reflects Blackmun’s changing 
views on a range of regularly contested issues.78 During his years on 
the Court, Blackmun became more willing to construe the Constitu-
                                                                                                                     
 72. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that certain 
conditions in Tennessee prisons violated constitutional rights); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967) (expressing reservations about precedent that dictated ap-
pellate court’s decision in civil rights setting), rev’d, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (abandoning the 
precedent criticized by Blackmun); Blackmun Hearing, supra note 71, at 37 (expressing be-
lief that his appellate court record “show[s] . . . , in the treatment of little people, what I 
hope is a sensitivity to their problems”); id. at 43-44 (reflecting his position that man is a 
social being and law is in part social, and that precedent is where one starts but times and 
judicial attitudes do change). 
 73. See Blackmun Hearing, supra note 71, at 10 (letter from ABA Standing Commit-
tee on Federal Judiciary, noting comments from one set of law review editors that Black-
mun might be “too subservient to precedent”); Rosenbaum, supra note 4 (“The striking fea-
ture about Mr. Blackmun, according to lawyers who have studied his decisions, is his simi-
larity to Mr. Burger as judge.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
 75. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809 (1975).  
 76. Data on voting patterns were compiled based on Table I(B) of Harvard Law Re-
view’s annual Supreme Court review issue, volumes 85 through 100. The decline in level of 
agreement between Burger and Blackmun was steady rather than sudden; it fell from 
89.9% in the 1970 Term to 69.6% in the 1978 Term and 50% in the 1985 Term. 
 77. This data also compiled based on Table I(B) of Harvard Law Review’s annual Su-
preme Court Review issue. Again, the increased association in voting behavior was more 
gradual than sudden. Blackmun’s alignment with Brennan went from 48.7% in the 1970 
Term to 58.8% in the 1978 Term and 80.3% in the 1985 Term. His alignment with Mar-
shall increased from 51.7% in the 1970 Term to 60.9% in the 1978 Term and 82.1% in the 
1985 Term. 
 78. The shift did not include the rights of criminal defendants under the Fourth 
Amendment; Blackmun basically remained the “law and order” appointee that President 
Nixon had wanted. See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Blackmun and Criminal Justice: A 
Modest Overview, 28 AKRON L. REV. 125, 142-45, 150-51 (1994) (discussing how Blackmun 
supported law enforcement officers’ search efforts in a number of discrete areas). 
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tion broadly in order to protect individual civil liberties.79 He exhib-
ited greater sympathy for persons living in conditions of economic 
hardship and emphasized the consequent importance of assuring ac-
cess to legal channels for those less well-off.80 Blackmun notably 
modified his doctrinal positions with respect to the Court’s role in po-
licing the lines between state and federal sovereignty,81 in deferring 
to the state to safeguard the interests of children,82 and in overseeing 
the implementation of capital punishment.83 
 There has been no shortage of informed speculation regarding 
why Justice Blackmun’s performance differed so sharply from what 
was predicted for him. In terms of an evolution in judicial philosophy, 
scholars and commentators have referred to Blackmun’s heightened 
sensitivity to the plight of “outsiders” in our society, especially their 
need for and entitlement to safeguards within the legal culture.84 
These observers have identified a concomitant erosion of Blackmun’s 
faith in government, particularly his belief in government’s ability 
and willingness to fulfill various protective functions for individuals 
and groups who are vulnerable or at risk.85 Blackmun’s philosophy 
did not simply emerge full-blown once he joined the Court, but the 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that wearing a jacket that bore the words “Fuck the Draft” was an “absurd and 
immature antic” that was “mainly conduct and little speech”), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 208, 214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that Court’s decision 
to allow prosecution for consensual homosexual activity in one’s own home betrayed pri-
vacy values deeply rooted in our constitutional traditions). 
 80. Compare Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 321-22 (1971) (rejecting as impertinent 
welfare recipient’s Fourth Amendment claim against a welfare-monitoring program), and 
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973) (rejecting indigent’s request to waive 
bankruptcy filing fee of fifty dollars and emphasizing that recommended installment pay-
ments would be “less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or 
two of cigarettes”), with Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing decision to uphold a congressional ban on use of Medicaid funds for nonthera-
peutic abortions as “condescen[ding]” and “punitive” toward indigent and financially help-
less women), and Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 46-47 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing decision denying right to counsel for indigent woman facing pro-
ceeding to terminate her parental rights). 
 81. Compare Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Black-
mun, J., majority opinion) (overruling National League of Cities).  
 82. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971) (upholding per-
formance of juvenile courts against constitutional challenge), with DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 212-13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lament-
ing mistreatment of a juvenile neglected by social service system). 
 83. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 408-10 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (agreeing that capital punishment as applied was not unconstitutional), with Herrera 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430-32 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (urging abandonment of 
death penalty as unconstitutionally arbitrary). 
 84. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 10; Harold Hongju Koh, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun, 108 HARV. L. REV. 20 (1994); Wasby, supra note 9, at 198; Note, The Changing 
Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717, 725-31 (1983). 
 85. See Wasby, supra note 9, at 198; Note, supra note 84, at 722-25. 
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fact that it was rooted to some extent in various pre-Supreme Court 
experiences86 hardly explains what brought it to fruition. 
 One factor that seems to have contributed in important respects to 
the development of Justice Blackmun’s jurisprudence is simply his 
exposure to the crucible of Supreme Court service. Blackmun seemed 
continuously affected by the “awesome realization”87 of the Supreme 
Court’s final power to affect the lives of individuals and the relation-
ships among institutions of government. That realization could have 
reinforced a faith in tradition or a deference to precedent that fre-
quently accompanies appellate court service. Instead, it seemed to 
liberate Blackmun, making him more open to the Court’s role in ad-
dressing unforeseen problems and proposing new solutions.88  
 In addition to his keen attention to the magnitude and novelty of 
the Court’s agenda, Blackmun may have been affected at a more per-
sonal level by a deterioration in his relationship with the Chief Jus-
tice. Looking back after a dozen years on the Court, Blackmun ex-
pressed frustration at the early public image of him as functioning 
under Burger’s control or influence.89 Further, Burger’s pattern of as-
signing majority opinions, apparently giving Blackmun an unusually 
small number of majorities in close or important cases and more than 
his share of the less glamorous Indian and tax decisions, may have 
played a role in the growing alienation between the two Justices.90  
 In assessing Blackmun’s development as a Justice, Professor 
Pamela Karlan referred to his intense awareness of the “profoundly 
lonely business” of judging,91 suggesting that for a sensitive person 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Blackmun Hearing, supra note 
71, at 38-39 (displaying sensitivity to alienation of youth in modern society, referring to 
what he had learned from his own experience with his daughters); Note, supra note 84, at 
723 (discussing Blackmun’s reliance on medical knowledge and historical context, gleaned 
in large part from experience as counsel to the Mayo Clinic, to deepen his understanding of 
the abortion issue while drafting Roe v. Wade). 
 87. Blackmun Hearings, supra note 71, at 43. 
 88. See Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations 
with Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 300 (2000); Note, supra note 84, 
at 734-36; cf. Blackmun Hearing, supra note 71, at 43 (responding to a question about the 
binding aspects of Court precedent by stating, “Judges, even Justices of the Supreme 
Court, are humans and I suppose attitudes change as we go along. . . . As times have 
changed, Justices have changed. People take a second look.”). 
 89. See John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Friends for Decades, but 
Years on Court Left Them Strangers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at A1 (chronicling gradual 
demise of the friendship between Justices Blackmun and Burger). 
 90. See Wasby, supra note 9, at 185, 196-97 (discussing a 1986 political science study 
showing that Blackmun ranked next to bottom in number of important cases he had been 
assigned and noting Burger’s penchant for giving Blackmun an unusually high number of 
unanimous or wide margin cases to write).  
 91. Karlan, supra note 10, at 185 (referring to Blackmun’s own statements on loneli-
ness); see also Jenkins, supra note 89, at 61 (quoting Blackmun’s reference to Supreme 
Court service as “distinctly lonely”). 
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such as Blackmun, this loneliness may have “deepen[ed] the reser-
voirs of empathy.”92 Observers also have pointed to Blackmun’s 
openness to change as a sign of maturity and a commitment to con-
tinued reflection;93 to his deep concern for fairness in judicial deci-
sions, especially as it affected the proverbial “little guy”;94 and to his 
receptivity to modes of understanding complex human events that 
transcended legal knowledge or analysis.95 
 Certain judicial attitudes associated with Justice Blackmun’s ca-
reer are not without their detractors. A penchant for self-doubt and 
openness to change are viewed at times as hallmarks of timidity if 
not inconsistency.96 Blackmun’s emotionally descriptive attentiveness 
to the plight of society’s outsiders has been dismissed as overly sen-
timental and lacking rigor.97 Despite such critiques, Blackmun is 
held in high regard by a range of legal and political pundits, based on 
his capacity for growth while on the Court, his ability to blend care-
ful craftsmanship with a strong sense of compassion, and his abiding 
awareness of how the law affects the circumstances and conditions of 
ordinary people.98  
                                                                                                                     
 92. Karlan, supra note 10, at 185.  
 93. See Richard S. Arnold, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
6, 9 (1994).  
 94. See Erwin N. Griswold, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 11, 12 (1994). 
 95. See Pamela S. Karlan, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
13, 16-18 (1994) (discussing Blackmun’s regular engagement with scientific and social sci-
entific data and his sensitivity to the relevance of literature). 
 96. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557-59 (1985) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (critical of Blackmun’s pivotal role in “precipitate overruling of mul-
tiple precedents” as undermining respect for Court’s authority); Jenkins, supra note 89, at 
57 (discussing criticisms of Blackmun’s focus on resolving discrete disputes while failing to 
propound consistent theories of law). See generally Idleman, supra note 65, at 1392-93; 
Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 804 (2003). The ten-
dency to evolve while a member of the Court may also be criticized as frustrating the le-
gitimate role played by the politically accountable branches in selecting an ideologically 
suitable candidate. For discussion of the interaction between law and politics in the selec-
tion of Justices and in Supreme Court decisionmaking, see infra Part II.A.  
 97. See Radhika Rao, The Author of Roe, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21, 38 (1998); Jef-
frey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun, NEW 
REPUBLIC, May 2, 1994, at 13. 
 98. See Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours Mirabeau, 59 
LA. L. REV. 647, 655 (1999) (reporting President Clinton’s description of Blackmun as an 
ideal Justice); Griswold, supra note 94, at 13 (describing Blackmun as “one of the truly 
great Justices of our time”); Press Release, Department of Justice, Statement by Attorney 
General Janet Reno on the Death of Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 4, 1999) (referring to 
Blackmun’s compassion, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law and calling him “a 
great Justice”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/March/076ag.htm. 
 Many of these observations were offered in the context of Justice Blackmun’s retirement 
from the Court or his death, moments when one would expect a laudatory tone. Yet there 
is a distinct contrast between what has been said about Blackmun and Burger on such oc-
casions. Tributes to Justice Burger are notably less effusive; they tend to focus less on his 
defining doctrinal contributions or his judicial philosophy and more on his contributions to 
the administration of justice or his general respect for our history and traditions. See, e.g., 
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 From a historical standpoint, it is probably too early for a thor-
ough evaluation of Justice Blackmun’s contributions. Some key 
qualities that make him a distinguished Justice to his supporters—
empathy for the litigants before him, an abiding interest in fairness, 
and a receptivity to extralegal modes of analysis—are doubtless 
viewed as shortcomings by his critics. Whether one is an acolyte or a 
dissenter, however, the qualities that have tended to focus debate 
about Blackmun’s “merit” as a Justice are hardly reflected in his ap-
pellate court citation count or his pattern of dissents as a member of 
the Eighth Circuit. The Choi and Gulati approach is simply not rele-
vant to this debate.  
 Justice Blackmun’s metamorphosis while a member of the Court 
may be more the exception than the rule.99 Still, the surprising na-
ture of his arc on the Supreme Court is far from unique. Although 
some Justices have turned out more liberal or attentive to questions 
of redistribution than their pre-Court record would have led one to 
expect, there are others whose careers on the Court were distinctly 
more conservative or protective of the status quo than was antici-
pated at the time of their appointment.100 
 Yet, insofar as predicting the future performance of Supreme 
Court candidates can be a hazardous business, reliance on quantita-
tive indicia of appellate court outputs is unlikely to clarify the crystal 
ball. This is due in part to the very different nature of the dockets 
confronted by appellate judges and Supreme Court Justices. The Su-
preme Court’s discretionary caseload is determined by how shifting 
coalitions of interested colleagues react to emerging developments in 
constitutional advocacy and legislative policy, developments that 
over the long term are largely unforeseeable. For example, Justice 
                                                                                                                     
John Edward Sexton, A Tribute to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 100 HARV. L. REV. 979, 
984 (1987) (discussing Burger’s role speaking out on problems of judicial system); Kenneth 
W. Starr, A Tribute to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 100 HARV. L. REV. 971 (1987) (dis-
cussing Burger’s respect for our history and traditions); Carl Tobias, Warren Burger and 
the Administration of Justice, 41 VILL. L. REV. 505 (1996) (focusing on Burger’s contribu-
tions to more efficient court management). 
 99. See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 113 (1999) (con-
tending, based on a consensus among scholars, that Presidents have enjoyed a seventy-five 
percent success rate in predicting the future ideological course pursued by their Supreme 
Court appointees); id. at 119-21 (arguing that for most Justices who depart from ideologi-
cal expectations, the departure may be attributed to a lack of relevant interest or atten-
tiveness by the appointing President, and that Blackmun’s evolution while a member of 
the Court was unusual even among the twenty-five percent classified as surprises). But cf. 
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 50-52 (rev. ed. 1999) 
(quoting several eminent Court scholars and former Presidents emphasizing the Presi-
dent’s limited ability to predict the performance of Supreme Court nominees). 
 100. Justices McReynolds and Frankfurter are two notable examples. See Paul 
Finkelman, You Can’t Always Get What You Want . . . : Presidential Elections and Supreme 
Court Appointments, 35 TULSA L.J. 473, 480-81 (2000).  
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Blackmun’s role in shaping the Court’s positions on abortion and 
commercial speech—and the impact that role had on his overall per-
formance as a Justice101—could hardly have been anticipated based 
on his Eighth Circuit record addressing a mandatory caseload largely 
characterized by more mundane matters of statutory interpretation.  
 In addition, the impact of precedent is diminished, and the impor-
tance of collegial interaction increased, on a court of last resort in 
which nine individuals decide every case en banc. Given the role 
played by personal dynamics in this unusually intense repeat-player 
setting, a Justice’s lifespan on the Court becomes a further major, 
unpredictable factor. Blackmun’s career would surely look different if 
he had left the Court after ten years instead of twenty-four, if the Ei-
senhower appointee who retired in 1981 had been Brennan rather 
than Stewart, or if the replacements for Burger, Powell, and Mar-
shall had been appointed by a Democratic President.102 
 In the end, Supreme Court performance depends heavily on fac-
tors that are qualitative and personal. These factors include individ-
ual character and sensibilities, biographical experiences within and 
outside the law, the particulars of interaction with a subtly changing 
set of colleagues, the impact of a fluid and highly controversial 
docket, and length of tenure on the Court. The heavily subjective fo-
cus does not mean that predictions about performance will not con-
tinue to be a familiar aspect of the Supreme Court appointments pro-
cess. As discussed in Part II, however, such predictions should be 
based on factors other than quantifiable production as an appellate 
judge. The Choi and Gulati approach would give Burger high marks 
for a performance criterion that turned out to represent one of his se-
rious shortcomings as a Supreme Court Justice. Further, the Choi 
and Gulati focus on appellate court outputs fails altogether to ac-
count for the qualities that principally defined Blackmun’s Supreme 
Court tenure. 
II.   POLITICS AND NONQUANTITATIVE FACTORS 
A.   The Legitimate and Appropriate Role of Politics 
 A driving force behind the Choi and Gulati proposal to measure 
and rank judicial performance is the authors’ belief that “politics is 
primarily to blame” for our “abysmal” system of selecting Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See Rao, supra note 97, at 34-35, 39-40 (discussing the impact of abortion cases on 
Justice Blackmun’s philosophy); William S. Dodge, Weighing the Listener’s Interests: Jus-
tice Blackmun’s Commercial Speech and Public Forum Opinions, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
165, 170-93 (1998) (discussing Blackmun’s role in shaping the Court’s position on commer-
cial speech). 
 102. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1595, 1641-45 (1995) (book review) (discussing factors that make it virtually impossi-
ble to predict judicial greatness).  
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Court Justices.103 Acknowledging that the political branches must 
continue to play a formal role in the nomination and confirmation 
process, Choi and Gulati maintain that their tournament will at least 
require politicians to address merit-based considerations in more ob-
jective and transparent terms.104 Ultimately, though, the authors 
seek to supplant the existing politically-based system; they contend 
that their market-based approach is normatively preferable to the 
opaqueness and subjectivity that are endemic to the political 
model.105  
 This effort to minimize if not eliminate the role of partisan and 
ideological considerations is in my view misguided. Initially, the 
Constitution in its design anticipates that politics will play an impor-
tant part in the judicial selection process. One indicator of the extent 
of presidential and senatorial control is the Constitution’s silence re-
garding any minimum qualifications for the federal judiciary. Al-
though minimum requirements are specified for the office of Presi-
dent and for members of Congress,106 the Framers entrusted the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches with complete discretion to deter-
mine judicial qualifications through their decisions regarding which 
individuals would be nominated and confirmed.107 From a historical 
standpoint, several factors may help explain the absence of objective 
criteria or threshold requirements for service on the Supreme 
Court.108 Whatever the explanation in original terms, there is an on-
going constitutional contemplation that the partisan preferences and 
ideological priorities of the politically accountable branches will play 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 301. 
 104. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 27, 29-30.  
 105. Id.; Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 302-04. 
 106. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (providing that President must be at least thirty-
five years of age, a natural born citizen, and a fourteen-year resident of the United States); 
id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that Representatives must be at least twenty-five years of 
age, citizens for seven or more years, and residents of their state); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (pro-
viding that Senators must be at least thirty years of age, citizens for nine or more years, 
and residents of their state). Article III of the Constitution contains no comparable re-
quirements for federal judges. See ABRAHAM, supra note 99, at 35 (noting the surprising 
absence of any constitutional requirements to become a federal judge). 
 107. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President has the power to 
appoint Supreme Court Justices “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”). The 
recruitment and selection of federal judges through the political process contrasts with the 
civil service approach to judicial selection adopted in some European countries. See 
PERETTI, supra note 99, at 85.  
 108. See John R. Vile & Mario Perez-Reilly, The U.S. Constitution and Judicial Quali-
fications: A Curious Omission, 74 JUDICATURE 198, 200-02 (1991) (suggesting that consti-
tutional silence may be due to the absence of contemporary standards for legal education 
or training, making it difficult to specify a uniform “lawyer” qualification; the absence of 
minimum age or educational requirements for judges serving under state constitutions of 
the time; and a concern that restrictive qualifications would serve to intensify fears of an 
aristocratic judiciary).  
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a role in the selection process, “serv[ing] as effective majoritarian 
checks on the [Supreme Court’s] counter-majoritarian function.”109  
 Such constitutional contemplation has become increasingly reso-
nant in today’s legal and public policy circumstances. Constitutional 
and statutory interpretation are now regularly matters of intense po-
litical controversy, and both the executive and legislative branches 
have come to understand the importance of investing in the judicial 
selection enterprise.110  
 It should not be surprising that the President and his agents re-
gard Supreme Court decisionmaking as directly related to the real 
and perceived success of their policy agenda. During our prolonged 
period of divided government,111 as enactment of major legislative re-
forms has become a special challenge, the White House has paid 
more attention to court-centered strategies as a means of implement-
ing changes in policy. Those strategies prominently include urging 
the Supreme Court to enforce certain legal rules expansively while 
arguing that the Court should act with restraint on other occasions 
involving related provisions of public law.112 Indeed, in managing 
embedded regulatory schemes that address politically contested sub-
jects such as civil rights, workplace standards, and consumer health 
or safety, the executive branch has often altered its litigation ap-
proach depending on which political party is shaping the federal gov-
ernment’s Supreme Court agenda.113 Accordingly, the President’s in-
                                                                                                                     
 109. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395, 419 (1994) 
(book review).  
 110. Arguments presented in the ensuing several paragraphs were initially developed 
in an earlier article. See James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 153-61 (2003).  
 111. Between 1968 and 2004, Congress (at least one chamber) and the Presidency were 
controlled by different parties seventy-five percent of the time: the exceptions were 1977-
1980 plus 1993-1994 (all Democratic) and 2001 plus 2003-2004 (all Republican). Even in 
those exceptional times, the Senate has had between 41 and 49 members from the minority 
party, allowing for the reality or threat of a filibuster, except for the two year period from 
1977-1978. See 2 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 1570 (John L. 
Moore et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001). 
 112. See Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White House Counsel 
in Constitutional Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 63, 84-86 (discussing 
White House influence in shaping Justice Department strategy on civil rights litigation be-
fore the Supreme Court). 
 113. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights 
from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,614-15 (1993) (describing Justice 
Department’s efforts during Reagan Administration to advocate less expansive approach 
toward enforcement of occupational health standards by shifting government’s position in 
the midst of 1981 Supreme Court litigation); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR 
GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 61 (1992) (reporting Reagan Administration’s 1982 rever-
sal of solicitor general’s position regarding the constitutionality of tax-exempt status for a 
private college that discriminated on basis of race, and noting that the Administration sub-
sequently appointed a team of private attorneys to develop the government’s Supreme 
Court brief); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of 
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1441 (1998) (reporting Clinton Admini-
2005]                          FORESEEING GREATNESS? 1041 
 
terest in appointing Supreme Court Justices based on political and 
ideological compatibility should be viewed as part of his effort to “in-
tegrat[e] the federal judiciary into the dominant lawmaking coali-
tion.”114 
 The Senate likewise has a considerable policy-related stake in the 
selection of Supreme Court Justices. Current majorities, and even 
filibuster-proof minorities, are strongly interested in confirming Jus-
tices who will not undermine preferred regulatory enactments or 
constitutional landmarks.115 More generally, because legislators ex-
pect courts in the future to be bound by the laws they enact in the 
present, they will be concerned not to endorse for a lifetime appoint-
ment any Justice perceived as unduly hostile to their current legisla-
tive agenda.116 A Congress worried about the potential for judicial de-
fiance does remain free to monitor Supreme Court performance after 
the fact, at least with respect to high-profile regulatory statutes that 
legislators want to see vigorously applied.117 In practice, however, it 
tends to be both arduous and depleting for Congress to invalidate ju-
                                                                                                                     
stration’s 1993 reversal of prior Justice Department position on retroactivity of Civil 
Rights Act of 1991); Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2004, at A1 (reporting on Bush Administration’s argument to Third Circuit 
against private right of action to challenge injuries from FDA-approved medical devices, 
the opposite position from what Clinton Administration argued before Supreme Court in 
1997); see also Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: 
Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 395-96 (2000) (discussing govern-
ment’s ability to pursue its policy program successfully before Supreme Court by selective 
filing of petitions for certiorari). 
 114. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Commentary on Selecting Federal Judges, 77 KY. L.J. 
619, 621 (1988-89). 
 115. See, e.g., The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 
467-68 (1987) (questioning of nominee by Sen. Metzenbaum with respect to enforcement of 
Occupational Safety and Health Act); The Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 64-65 (1990) (questioning of nominee by Sen. Thurmond with re-
spect to the validity of Congress’s efforts to limit number of post-trial appeals by death row 
inmates); id. at 53-55 (questioning of nominee by Sen. Biden with respect to foundation 
and scope of constitutional right to privacy).  
 116. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 581 (1992) (suggesting that each enacting Congress wants 
its laws enforced and sympathetically applied into the future, and that courts can encour-
age sitting legislators to act carefully and deliberatively by interpreting earlier legislative 
products in a sensitive fashion); McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 185-86 (1999) (discussing risk that courts will try 
to impose their own policy preferences, subtly or profoundly altering a political compromise 
years after its enactment). 
 117. An often-cited example is the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which overrode all or parts of 
numerous Supreme Court decisions. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 23-90 (1991) (re-
viewing action to override or modify results from ten Supreme Court decisions). See gener-
ally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing override statutes from 1967 to 1990). But cf. 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 73-76 (1997) (reporting very low congres-
sional staff awareness of important statutory interpretation decisions by the D.C. Circuit). 
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dicial interpretations of a federal statute with which most legislators 
disagree.118 
 There are, of course, risks that undue emphasis on political or 
ideological background during the selection process may undermine 
the Court’s basic decisionmaking function. Senators and Presidents 
have professed their awareness of this risk when they publicly es-
chew the use of litmus test screening that asks candidates to make 
advance commitments on specific issues of constitutional or statutory 
interpretation.119 At the same time, consideration of ideological back-
ground for its general predictive value would not appear to jeopard-
ize the principled core of judicial decisionmaking, especially when—
as is often the case—the White House and the Senate focus on that 
background in an effort to temper perceived excesses by the other 
branch.120 Moreover, when the Senate fails to review candidly a 
                                                                                                                     
 118. The difficulties stem both from the lack of time and information needed to monitor 
statutory interpretation decisions and from the procedural and resource constraints that 
inhibit legislative success. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES 39-43, 194 (1984) (discussing limitations on members’ access to sophisticated pol-
icy information and on the political capital available to each Senator or Representative); 
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle 
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-26 (1994) (discussing finite resources 
and limited windows of opportunity that restrict Congress’s legislative capacity); Stefanie 
A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 
85 JUDICATURE 61, 63-64, 68 (2001) (reviewing 966 committee reports accompanying every 
bill reported out of House, Senate, or conference committee from 1990 to 1998, and finding 
that enacted bills responded to 65 circuit court cases (clarifying, codifying, or overriding) 
and that reports referred to a total of 187 specific circuit court cases out of more than 
200,000 decisions in that nine year period). 
 119. See, e.g., Judicial Nominations 2001: Should Ideology Matter?: Hearing Before the 
S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 30 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch, contending that “the Senate’s responsibility to 
provide advice and consent [should] not include an ideological litmus test, because a nomi-
nee’s personal opinions are largely irrelevant so long as the nominee can set those opinions 
aside and follow the law fairly and impartially as a judge”); Nat Hentoff, To Get a Supreme 
Court Seat, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1999, at A17 (reporting then-presidential candidate 
George W. Bush’s statement that he would not require an ideological litmus test for the 
Supreme Court). But cf. id. (reporting then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s 1992 
statement to Bill Moyers that he would want his first Supreme Court appointee to be a 
strong supporter of Roe v. Wade, although it made him uncomfortable to be taking such a 
litmus test position). 
 120. See David L. Greene, ‘Big Fight’ Brewing on Judicial Nominee; Md. Senators Try 
to Block Bush Pick from Virginia, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 2003, at A1 (reporting President 
Bush’s criticism of Senate Judiciary Committee Democrats as “‘playing politics with 
American justice’” by blocking floor votes on his judicial nominees); Robin Toner & Neil A. 
Lewis, Lobbying Starts as Groups Foresee Vacancy on Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at 
A1 (reporting Democratic Senators and liberal interest groups as concerned about possibil-
ity that President Bush will nominate an extreme right-wing ideologue to the Supreme 
Court). See generally Jon O. Newman, Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 10, 12 
(2002) (discussing role of Senate in steering President’s judicial appointments toward the 
middle); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power: The Senate’s Role in the Ap-
pointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 26 (2002) (discussing how Presidents’ 
more distinct policy agenda in selecting judicial nominees has triggered increased atten-
tion by Senators to those nominees).  
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nominee’s ideology or judicial philosophy, it tends instead to pursue 
alternative strategies that may be disingenuous if not unseemly.121 
 None of this is meant to suggest that political factors should be 
the primary qualification for ascending to the Supreme Court. There 
is an expectation that candidates should be exceptionally accom-
plished in terms of their professional abilities, temperament, and in-
tegrity. The American Bar Association has evaluated Supreme Court 
candidates on such merit-based grounds since the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration; until recently, both Congress and the executive branch 
have utilized those evaluations.122  
 In addition, a focus on competence and integrity as essential ele-
ments in the appointments process is eminently reasonable from the 
President’s standpoint. As a regular repeat player in Supreme Court 
litigation, the executive branch should prefer Justices who are likely 
to apply language, precedent, and logical reasoning in largely rigor-
ous fashion when deciding cases. The White House also may see 
some political value in appointing a “higher quality” Justice who is 
well received by the organized bar and the informed media, and may 
perceive a corresponding political cost in installing mediocre or dis-
reputable individuals on the Court.123 
                                                                                                                     
 121. These strategies have often included review of a nominee’s past non-ideological 
indiscretions or his asserted ethical misconduct in the private sphere. See, e.g., Adell 
Crowe, People Watch, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1987, at 4A (describing how a local Washing-
ton, D.C., paper obtained a list of videos rented by Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s 
wife to investigate whether Bork might have watched X-rated films); Steven V. Roberts, 
Ginsburg Withdraws Name as Supreme Court Nominee, Citing Marijuana ‘Clamor,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1987, at A1 (describing how reports of Douglas Ginsburg’s marijuana smok-
ing while a Harvard law professor led to his withdrawing as Supreme Court nominee); 
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 239, 247-63 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing con-
cerns fueled if not inspired by conservative anti-New Deal media and interest groups to re-
veal Senator Black’s earlier membership in the Ku Klux Klan as a means of defeating his 
Supreme Court appointment).  
 122. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 99, at 25-28; GEORGE WATSON & JOHN A. 
STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 83-85, 108-
12 (1995); Roberta Cooper Ramo & N. Lee Cooper, The American Bar Association’s Integral 
Role in the Federal Judicial Selection Process: Excerpted Testimony of Roberta Cooper 
Ramo and N. Lee Cooper Before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, May 
21, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 93, 106-08 (1996). But see Terry Carter, A 
Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32 (reporting Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Chairman’s decision to end ABA’s formal role of advising the Senate, based on his view 
that the ABA was too liberal); Amy Goldstein, Bush Curtails ABA Role in Selecting U.S. 
Judges, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at A1 (reporting President George W. Bush’s decision 
to discontinue fifty year tradition of executive branch reliance on ABA for advice on poten-
tial candidates for federal bench). 
 123. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION 
FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 4 note c (1997) (discussing why it is both good presi-
dential policy and good politics to recruit and nominate highly qualified judges). The un-
successful effort by certain Senators to make a virtue out of mediocrity with respect to a 
Supreme Court nominee illustrates the outlier nature of such anti-merit sentiments. See 
ABRAHAM, supra note 99, at 11 (recounting comments by Senator Hruska, floor manager 
for the Carswell nomination, that “[e]ven if he is mediocre there are a lot of mediocre 
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 There will be an ample number of suitably accomplished individu-
als available for each open seat on the Supreme Court, even assum-
ing a limited pool of well qualified candidates. In this setting, consid-
erations of “merit”124 are a necessary and important element of the 
appointment process, but they cannot fully define that process. This 
is because, while the Supreme Court is expected to act in a principled 
and intellectually coherent manner when resolving disputes of law, it 
has long been understood that the Court’s legal propositions are re-
plete with judgments and choices that have significant policy conse-
quences.125 In appellate controversies involving two thoroughly 
briefed positions, norms of legal craftsmanship constrain the judges’ 
policymaking discretion. At the same time, these norms can often be 
met regardless of which side prevails; indeed, a Justice who wants to 
see his policy preferences implemented will presumably make every 
effort to provide a coherent, well-reasoned, and carefully crafted legal 
opinion.126  
 Choi and Gulati’s tournament attaches little or no value to the in-
evitable interplay of law and policy in Supreme Court decisionmak-
ing. By contrast, the real world sees considerable value in this inter-
play, as evidenced by the intense recognition it receives during the 
appointments process. The President and the Senate regularly seek 
to shade the future judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court toward 
their own broadly conceived policy preferences. The fact that their re-
liance on political and ideological considerations is susceptible to oc-
casional misuse does not impeach the legitimacy of such reliance, 
                                                                                                                     
judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and 
a little chance? We can’t have all Brandeises, Cardozos, and Frankfurters, and stuff like 
that there” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But cf. JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST 
CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME 
COURT 125-26, 133-42, 187 (2001) (discussing President Nixon’s willingness to consider 
mediocre or even outrageous candidates for the Supreme Court in 1971, at least partly as a 
form of payback for the Senate’s previous rejection of his nominees).  
 124. For reasons discussed in Part I, supra, it is far from clear that Choi and Gulati’s 
measurable performance factors based on appellate court outputs are preferable to the cur-
rent, less quantitative approach as a way of evaluating the professional talents and tem-
perament of prospective Supreme Court candidates. 
 125. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IN A DEMOCRACY 173-74 (1960) (discussing widespread recognition that constitutional law 
consists of both “a great deal of sheer legal technicality” and profoundly value-laden judg-
ments regarding public policy; because these questions of law and policy overlap and are 
inseparable, “[l]egal acumen [is] not a sufficient condition . . . for dealing competently with 
questions of constitutional law”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS 374 (1960) (discussing the importance of reading a statute in light of 
some assumed purpose known to the legislature and observing that as a statute ages, an 
appellate court must apply it to circumstances uncontemplated at the time of enactment, 
in effect extrapolating from the initial purpose to make new policy). 
 126. See PERETTI, supra note 99, at 82, 159 (arguing that when Justices vote in accor-
dance with their political preferences, a well-crafted and intellectually rigorous decision is 
less likely to activate the political sanctions that are occasionally used or threatened 
against the Court). 
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provided it is combined with a threshold concern for sufficiently 
meritorious candidates.127 Thus, for both principled and practical 
reasons, the two branches constitutionally charged with recruiting 
and selecting members of the Court will continue to search for an ap-
propriate composite of law-related expertise and policy-related wis-
dom.  
B.   Collegiality and Career Diversity 
 In focusing on performance criteria that lend themselves to quan-
titative and comparative measurement, Choi and Gulati omit consid-
eration of other, more “qualitative” factors that make critical contri-
butions to the appellate decisionmaking process. I will touch briefly 
on two important aspects of individual judicial performance that are 
not easily analyzed at the empirical level—collegiality and career di-
versity. 
1.   Collegiality 
 Judges and judicial scholars have identified various ways in which 
collegiality provides shape and direction to group decisionmaking on 
an appellate court. As a process matter, collegial interaction tends to 
sharpen and deepen a court’s reasoning. Judges in conference who 
carefully engage and evaluate the arguments and explanations of-
fered by their colleagues are likely to create a better informed and in-
tellectually more rigorous final product even if no one’s vote is 
changed during deliberations.128 In addition, an individual appellate 
                                                                                                                     
 127. To be sure, invocation of these policy-related considerations does not always pro-
duce the expected results, as aptly illustrated by the Burger and Blackmun stories. Despite 
their pre-Court similarity in political and ideological background, they turned out to differ 
markedly as Justices on a range of policy and value-laden controversies that came before 
the Court. Such surprises, however, will not deter the President and the Senate from ef-
forts to identify individuals who combine an acceptably high level of legal craftsmanship 
with a suitably worthwhile set of policy preferences. See generally PERETTI, supra note 99, 
at 80-86, 130-32. 
 Choi and Gulati would presumably prefer that Justices’ ideological orientations be ran-
domly distributed based on whoever has been found most meritorious under their three 
criteria. There are at least two problems with this approach, both alluded to in the text. 
First, it thwarts input from the political branches, input anticipated under our constitu-
tional design. Second, it underestimates the sophistication and ingenuity of these political 
branches in being able to package or manipulate appellate judges’ “objective” scores in the 
service of an ideological agenda. 
 128. Deanell Reece Tacha, The “C” Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 587 
(1995); see also Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 300-01, 307-08 (1986) (discussing impact of voting memos and regu-
lar oral argument in developing intellectual common ground on a panel); James L. Oakes, 
On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and Judging, 104 YALE L.J. 2369, 2376-77 (1995) (book re-
view) (recounting Judge Coffin’s discussion of the importance during collective judicial de-
liberations of responsive dialogue and constructive reaction to suggestions from other 
judges). 
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judge whose personal style helps foster a background norm of cordial, 
courteous relations may well play a more important role on conten-
tious issues for which he has managed to facilitate continuing con-
versation.129 
 Collegiality affects decisionmaking at a substantive level as well, 
again operating in at least two distinct ways. By encouraging judges 
to modify their personal predilections and soften their traditional ad-
vocacy-oriented approach, the “filter” of collegiality can enhance 
prospects for a consensus that “mitigates judges’ ideological prefer-
ences.”130 In this respect, collegiality functions to constrain the influ-
ence of a judge’s personal vision or outlook. At the same time, colle-
giality can also produce consequences that are more ideologically di-
rectional. Judges whose reasoning skills and doctrinal vision are 
augmented by an ability to cultivate warm personal relationships 
with colleagues may be especially successful in forging alliances that, 
over time, determine a series of outcomes giving shape to an entire 
area of law.131 
 Although an integral part of the appellate decisionmaking proc-
ess, collegiality is not readily measurable in the output-dependent 
terms relied upon by Choi and Gulati. Judge Harry Edwards has 
suggested that as a “qualitative variable . . . involv[ing] mostly pri-
vate personal interactions,” collegiality may not be measurable at 
all.132 The ongoing private exchanges to which Judge Edwards refers 
seem likely to have an especially pervasive and subtle influence at 
the Supreme Court, where decisionmakers do more than simply come 
together from geographically dispersed locations on a periodic basis 
in order to resolve particular cases. The Justices effectively live to-
gether in professional terms, continuously inhabiting the same intel-
lectual space; they have been described by one veteran Court ob-
server as “locked into intricate webs of interdependence where the 
impulse to speak in a personal voice must always be balanced 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See Gerhardt, supra note 102, at 1613-14 (discussing John C. Jeffries’ biography 
of Justice Lewis F. Powell and noting Jeffries’ suggestion that Powell’s “‘ingrained courtesy 
and ability to listen’” may have enhanced his pivotal position in many instances even if he 
did not seek such a position). 
 130. Edwards, supra note 19, at 1689. 
 131. See Gerhardt, supra note 102, at 1611-12 (discussing Roger K. Newman’s biogra-
phy of Justice Hugo Black and noting Newman’s contention that Black’s friendly de-
meanor, civility, and personal political skills enabled him to exert far greater influence on 
the Court than his chief rival, Justice Frankfurter, over a period of more than twenty 
years); Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 
13, 14 (1990) (discussing how Justice Brennan’s personal qualities made him “the su-
premely collegial Justice” and observing that his consequent skill in constructing coalitions 
sustained his influence in doctrinal terms even after the Court’s balance of power had 
shifted away from him). 
 132. Edwards, supra note 19, at 1656. “Regression analysis does not do well in captur-
ing the nuances of human personalities and relationships . . . .” Id. 
2005]                          FORESEEING GREATNESS? 1047 
 
against the need to act collectively in order to be effective.”133 It is 
therefore not surprising that the collegiality factor often figures 
prominently as part of in-depth examinations into the strengths or 
shortcomings of individual Supreme Court Justices.134 
 To take just one example, the conference at which all nine Jus-
tices exchange views following oral argument affords an opportunity 
for wielding influence.135 Justice Thurgood Marshall’s colleagues 
have remarked on how deeply he affected their thinking during con-
ferences, in ways that would hardly be amenable to formal meas-
urement yet seem quite relevant when considering the “quality” of a 
Supreme Court Justice.136 Moreover, given that collegiality involves 
complex elements of personal chemistry, it is not clear that one’s 
reputation and accomplishments on an appellate court will be repli-
cated or even approximated with an entirely new group of judicial 
peers.137 In sum, while the Choi and Gulati framework should not be 
expected to capture all merit-related dimensions of judging, its exclu-
sive focus on quantifiable criteria overlooks a substantial and influ-
ential judicial attribute.138 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Linda Greenhouse, The Court: Same Time Next Year. And Next Year., N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2002, § 4, at 3. 
 134. See Gerhardt, supra note 102, at 1610-14 (discussing how biographers of Justice 
Black and Justice Powell analyzed their respective subject’s collegiality and reached differ-
ent conclusions). 
 135. See ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, CASES LOST, CAUSES WON: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 45-47 (1984); RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 80-81 (1980). But cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME 
COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 290-95 (1987) (finding that in Burger Court, conference 
discussions did not generally change minds or votes); Ruing Fixed Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 1988, at A16 (reporting Justice Scalia’s disappointment, after two years on the 
Court, that conference involves more statements of views by nine Justices than efforts to 
persuade others to change minds). 
 136. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 23, 25-26 (1991) (describing how, in school desegregation cases in which 
Marshall did not write an opinion, his “strong statements” at conference “drawing on his 
familiarity with the problems” made his colleagues more determined to reach unanimous 
decisions); Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992) (describing how Marshall’s personal stories and renditions 
of his life experiences during conference meetings prodded his colleagues “to respond not 
only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also to the power of moral truth”); An-
thony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1222 (1992) 
(emphasizing that Marshall’s “gift of story-telling [during conferences was] not some inci-
dental facet or adornment of [his] character and personality” but rather “an essential part 
of his professional greatness”).  
 137. See Duscha, supra note 53 (describing Judge Burger’s quiet methods of persuasion 
among his D.C. Circuit colleagues and suggesting that Burger had some success in build-
ing coalitions on that court). 
 138. Other important judicial attributes, such as integrity and temperament, may also 
be difficult or impossible to assess in empirical terms, but that discussion is beyond the 
scope of this Essay. See Ramo & Cooper, supra note 122, at 102-03 (describing qualitative 
elements that go into evaluating a nominee’s integrity and judicial temperament).  
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2.   Career Diversity 
 An important presumption underlying the Choi and Gulati 
framework is that Supreme Court Justices should be selected pri-
marily if not exclusively from the pool of sitting appellate court 
judges. It is true that in recent decades, federal appellate experience 
has become almost mandatory for appointment to the Supreme 
Court: seven of the last eight Justices chosen, and ten of the last 
thirteen, were serving on the circuit courts when nominated.139 Choi 
and Gulati are inclined to view this increasingly standard practice as 
not just inevitable but appropriate. While they would allow the pool 
to be expanded under certain conditions, they maintain that data 
chronicling appellate judges’ performance are likely to be the best 
predictor of future conduct on the Supreme Court, because no other 
apprenticeship has job responsibilities that are as closely analo-
gous.140 
 One difficulty with this presumption is that in reinforcing the cur-
rent status quo, it may well sacrifice prospects for improved institu-
tional decisionmaking by depriving the Court of more diverse career 
perspectives. Justice Cardozo famously referred to the value of hav-
ing a “balance of eccentricities” to generate more reliable and re-
spected legal standards.141 The value of the experiential range of 
those eccentricities is diminished when almost all Justices have ap-
pellate court judging as their most recent and by implication most 
meaningful professional exposure. 
 There is considerable evidence in the legal and social science lit-
erature that career diversity is significantly associated with the vot-
ing patterns of appellate judges.142 Professors Lee Epstein, Jack 
Knight, and Andrew Martin recently surveyed twenty-two studies 
that had investigated linkages between career experience and judi-
cial outcomes, concluding that nearly seventy percent had found 
some sort of relationship.143 Those findings, combined with the 
broader literature suggesting that diversity enhances the collective 
                                                                                                                     
 139. The only exceptions, dating back to 1967, are Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and 
O’Connor. Justice O’Connor was a sitting state appellate judge. 
 140. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 318-20. 
 141. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177 (1921) (“The 
eccentricities of judges balance one another. . . . [O]ut of the attrition of diverse minds 
there is beaten something which has a constancy and uniformity and average value greater 
than its component elements.”). 
 142. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Conse-
quences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 961-65 (2003) 
(listing twenty-two studies exploring linkages between judges’ prior occupations and their 
decisionmaking); Brudney, supra note 110, at 169-70 (reviewing studies that have demon-
strated associations between judicial voting patterns and experience as a law professor, 
experience as a prosecutor, and experience in elected office). 
 143. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 954. 
2005]                          FORESEEING GREATNESS? 1049 
 
decisionmaking enterprise,144 should make us wary of too readily ac-
cepting or encouraging the value of homogeneous formative experi-
ences for Supreme Court service. 
 A useful illustration is the virtually complete loss of the perspec-
tive of those Justices who had formerly held federal or state elected 
office. Until Chief Justice Warren’s retirement in 1969, the Court for 
nearly fifty years included anywhere from two to five Justices who 
had spent substantial time serving as U.S. Senators or Representa-
tives, state legislators, governors, or (in one instance) President.145 Of 
twenty-one Justices appointed between 1921 and 1953, seven had 
previously been elected to federal office and six to state office.146 In 
stark contrast, of twenty Justices appointed since 1953, none had 
previously held federal elected office, and only one (Justice O’Connor) 
had been elected to serve at the state legislative or executive level. 
 While there are risks to generalizing about relations between the 
branches of government, it seems safe to observe that Supreme Court 
attitudes and approaches toward Congress’s lawmaking processes 
and Congress’s final work products were more deferential from the 
1940s to at least the mid 1970s than they have become in more re-
cent times.147 Many complex factors and circumstances have doubt-
less contributed to these changes at the Court, and there are diver-
                                                                                                                     
 144. See id. at 941-53 (discussing importance of diversity as a justification for collective 
decisionmaking in general, for competitive markets, and for common law courts). See gen-
erally Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Ra-
cial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117; The Effects of Gender 
in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994). 
 145. From 1945 to 1956, five of the nine Court seats were occupied by individuals who 
had held federal or state elected offices, including Hugo Black (ten years in U.S. Senate); 
Stanley Reed (four years in Kentucky legislature); Harold Burton (four years in U.S. Sen-
ate); a seat occupied consecutively by Frank Murphy (two years as Michigan Governor) and 
Sherman Minton (six years in U.S. Senate); and a seat occupied consecutively by Fred Vin-
son (fourteen years in U.S. House) and Earl Warren (ten years as California Governor). 2 
DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 975-1023 (4th ed. 2004).  
 146. The seven with federal elective office experience included three with Senate ex-
perience, one with House experience, two with both Senate and House experience, and one 
who had served as President. The six who had state elective office experience included 
three former governors and three former state legislators (two of whom also went on to 
serve in the U.S. Senate). See id. 
 147. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. 
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 185-203 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing evolution of less defer-
ential Commerce Clause doctrine); id. at 220-30 (discussing development of less deferential 
Court perspective on Congress’s power to enforce Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
id. at 233-55 (discussing evolution in Court’s willingness to imply Tenth Amendment limits 
on Congress’s powers); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 742-58 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing current, less deferential Court perspective on the 
probative value of legislative history or “legislative intent” in understanding statutory 
meaning).  
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gent normative views as to the value of such changes.148 One might 
reasonably wonder, though, whether the Court’s dramatically de-
creased personal familiarity with how Congress or legislators gener-
ally operate has played a role in the doctrinal shift, as well as 
whether a Court dominated by former federal appellate judges is not 
perhaps affecting the tenor and direction of decisions in other ways. 
 Choi and Gulati are aware of the diversity problem; they have 
forthrightly offered to accommodate alternative career paths based 
on development of suitable measurement techniques.149 Yet, a focus 
on quantifiable performance criteria is likely to miss the larger and 
subtler ways in which appellate judges are influenced by the distinc-
tive professional perspectives of their colleagues. One can envision an 
approach that measures legislators’ effectiveness based on their per-
centage of missed floor votes; the number of bills sponsored, hearings 
chaired, or live floor speeches delivered; and perhaps even the num-
ber of enacted public laws for which they receive total or partial 
credit. It is questionable whether these or related measurements can 
adequately capture what makes prior experience in Congress or state 
legislatures a valuable “qualifier” for Supreme Court service. 
CONCLUSION 
 Professors Choi and Gulati are surely correct to insist on the im-
portance of merit or competence in the selection process for Supreme 
Court Justices. They also rightly argue for a less disingenuous ap-
proach to merit-based assessment on the part of both Congress and 
the White House. However, their evaluative focus on the transpar-
ency and objectivity of appellate judge track records would not be an 
improvement on our current, admittedly imperfect, system. 
 The assumption that prior judicial experience should be a princi-
pal determinant of Supreme Court potential has itself been chal-
lenged by scholars of the Court.150 One need not fully embrace such 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Compare Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Anti-
discrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) (critical of 
Court’s diminished deference), A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding 
to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal 
Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001) (same), and Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, 
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001) (same), with Steven G. Calabresi, “A Gov-
ernment of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (supportive of Court’s diminished deference), John C. Yoo, The 
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997) (same), and John F. 
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) (same).  
 149. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 319-20. 
 150. See Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. 
REV. 781, 795 (1957) (concluding, upon review of Justices’ careers over 167 years, that 
“[o]ne is entitled to say without qualification that the correlation between prior judicial ex-
perience and fitness for the functions of the Supreme Court is zero”); Gregory A. Caldeira, 
In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 
2005]                          FORESEEING GREATNESS? 1051 
 
challenges in order to question the predictive value of this experience 
as measured in purely quantitative terms. Viewed in a comparative 
setting, the appellate court outputs of Warren Burger and Harry 
Blackmun are not overly enlightening with regard to the very differ-
ent agenda and dynamics that confront Supreme Court Justices. In 
addition, by dismissing politics as a major flaw in the selection proc-
ess, Choi and Gulati ignore the legitimate and appropriately con-
straining roles played by both political branches. Finally, there are 
certain more qualitative factors important to the Court’s effective 
performance as a lawmaking institution; while these may be difficult 
to assess on an individual candidate basis, they should not be over-
looked when considering each candidate’s potential to achieve great-
ness or to enhance the success of the Court.  
                                                                                                                     
247, 258 (1988) (using multivariate model to conclude, inter alia, that contrary to much 
conventional wisdom, there is no association between judicial experience and eminence as 
a Supreme Court Justice). 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 – PUBLISHED MAJORITIES 
D.C. CIRCUIT 1957-1968 
JUDGE 
FULL 
YEARS 
ACTIVE 
NO. OF MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTIVITY SCORE 
CIRCUIT 
RANK 
EDGERTON 6 82 -1.11 13 
MILLER 7 95 -1.17 14 
PRETTYMAN 5 99 0.39 4 
BAZELON 12 220 -0.09 8 
FAHY 12 227 0.26 5 
WASHINGTON 8 152 0.10 6 
DANAHER 12 214 -0.07 7 
BASTIAN 8 127 -0.66 10 
BURGER 12 254 0.63 2 
WRIGHT 6 100 -0.24 9 
MCGOWAN 5 104 0.51 3 
TAMM 3 41 -0.77 11 
LEVENTHAL 3 87 1.85 1 
ROBINSON 2 26 -0.96 12 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1960-1969 
JUDGE 
FULL 
YEARS 
ACTIVE 
NO. OF MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTIVITY SCORE 
CIRCUIT 
RANK 
WOODROUGH 1 14 -0.44 9 
JOHNSEN 5 31 -1.56 12 
VOGEL 8 166 0.18 4 
VON OOSTER-
HOUT 10 255 0.76 1 
MATTHES 10 220 0.30 3 
BLACKMUN 10 210 0.01 6 
RIDGE 4 54 -0.52 10 
MEHAFFY 6 136 -0.28 8 
GIBSON 6 120 0.07 5 
LAY 3 69 -0.18 7 
HEANEY 3 76 0.38 2 
BRIGHT 1 24 -1.06 11 
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TABLE 2 – CITATIONS OUTSIDE OWN CIRCUIT 
D.C. CIRCUIT MAJORITY OPINIONS 1963-1966 
JUDGE 
NUMBER 
OF 
MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
OUTSIDE CIRCUIT CITES 
THROUGH 5/31/69—OVERALL 
MEAN 
OUTSIDE CIRCUIT CITES 
THROUGH 5/31/69—TOP 20 
MEAN 
BAZELON 86 3.71 10.40 
FAHY 85 3.33 9.65 
DANAHER 66 2.03 5.70 
BURGER 67 6.09 16.00 
WRIGHT 65 4.88 11.10 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT MAJORITY OPINIONS 1963-1966 
JUDGE 
NUMBER OF 
MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
OUTSIDE CIRCUIT CITES 
THROUGH 5/31/69—OVERALL 
MEAN 
OUTSIDE CIRCUIT CITES 
THROUGH 5/31/69—TOP 
20 MEAN 
VOGEL 90 3.41 9.85 
VAN OOSTER-
HOUT 111 2.90 8.15 
MATTHES 93 2.98 7.60 
BLACKMUN 95 5.66 16.50 
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TABLE 3 – DISSENTS/CONCURRENCES  
D.C. CIRCUIT 1957-1968 
JUDGE 
FULL 
YEARS 
ACTIVE 
NO. OF 
MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
NO. OF 
CONCURRING 
OPINIONS 
NO. OF 
DISSENTING 
OPINIONS 
SEPARATE 
OPS. PER 
FULL YEAR 
CIR. 
RANK 
EDGERTON 6 82 7 29 6.00 9 
MILLER 7 95 17 72 12.70 3 
PRETTYMAN 5 99 7 17 4.80 12 
BAZELON 12 220 58 135 16.10 1 
FAHY 12 227 40 89 10.75 5 
WASHINGTON 8 152 23 30 6.60 8 
DANAHER 12 214 28 69 8.10 7 
BASTIAN 8 127 5 39 5.50 10 
BURGER 12 254 60 70 10.80 4 
WRIGHT 6 100 42 53 15.80 2 
MCGOWAN 5 104 18 8 5.20 11 
TAMM 3 41 5 21 8.70 6 
LEVENTHAL 3 87 9 5 4.70 13 
ROBINSON 2 26 4 1 2.50 14 
TOTAL 101 1828 323 638 9.51(MEAN)  
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1960-1969 
JUDGE 
FULL 
YEARS 
ACTIVE 
NO. OF 
MAJORITY 
OPINIONS 
NO. OF 
CONCURRING 
OPINIONS 
NO. OF 
DISSENTING 
OPINIONS 
SEPARATE 
OPS. PER 
FULL YEAR 
CIR.
RANK 
WOODROUGH 1 14 0 5  5.00 2 
JOHNSEN 5 31 1 2  0.60 10 
VOGEL 8 166 1 4  0.62 9 
VAN OOSTER-
HOUT 10 255 6 10  1.60 6 
MATTHES 10 220 4 5  0.90 7 
BLACKMUN 10 210 7 11  1.80 5 
RIDGE 4 54 0 3  0.75 8 
MEHAFFY 6 136 0 3  0.50 11 
GIBSON 6 120 0 3  0.50 11 
LAY 3 69 7 10  5.70 1 
HEANEY 3 76 0 6  2.00 3 
BRIGHT 1 24 2 0  2.00 3 
TOTAL 67 1375 28 62 1.34 (MEAN)  
 
